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FOR H. R. II AND S. II
TO STRENGTHEN THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
AND AMEND THE ANTITRUST LAW
PROHIBITING PRICE DISCRIMINATION
WRIGHT PATMAN, M. C.*
INTODUCTION

H. R. 11 and S. 11 are modest and simple legislative proposals.'
They provide for no change in our antitrust laws prohibiting price
discrimination except to limit somewhat the use of the "good faith"

defense. The extent of this limitation goes no further than to assist
the Act by providing that the "good faith" defense shall not operate
as an absolute and complete bar to a proceeding by the Government
against the practices of destructive price discrimination: In other
words, those discriminations which would have the effect of substantially lessening competition and tending to create a monopoly
may not be defended by showing that they were practiced in "good
faith."
It appears that those opposing H. R. 11 and S. 11 want to insure
legality of price discriminations, even at the cost of lessenig competition and creation of monopoly. Actually, they are arguing for those
ugly results, with the concession that the ugliness my be covered
* Member of Congress; member of Texas Bar. The author has represented
the First Congressional District of Texas in the House of Representatives of
the United States since March 4, 1929. He and Senator Joseph Robinson of
Arkansas co-authored the Robinson-Patman Act. Many other legislative proposals have been introduced by the author in the House of Representatives to
strengthen Federal anti-trust legislation.
1. At the opening of the 84th Congress in January 1955, H.R. 11 was introduced in the House by Representative Wright Patman (D., Texas). The
text of that bill was as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That sub-section (b) of section 2
of the Act entitled "An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful
restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes," approved October 15,
1914, as amended (15 U.S.C. 13 (b)), is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. (b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under
this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made by
showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of
this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That unless the effect of the discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce it shall be a complete defense for a seller to show that his lower
price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or
the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
At the same time, an identical companion bill, S.11, was introduced in the
Senate by Senator Estes Kefauver (D., Tenn.). Approximately 30 Senators
joined with Senator Kefauver in co-authoring S. 11. Approximately 50
members of the House of Representatives either introduced in the House
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with the veil of "good faith" meeting of competition. Therefore, the
naked issue over whether H. R. 11 and S. 11 should be enacted into
law is, like the bill, quite simple. It is this: "Shall we tolerate practices
which destroy competition and create monopoly, even when those practices are based upon good intentions?" It should not be difficult for
us to resolve that issue, especially in the light of our national antimonopoly public policy. Certainly, no practice destructive of competition and creative of monopoly can be said to be consonant with our
companion bills to H.R. 11 (which according to House rules were required
to bear different numbers) or announced that they were co-sponsoring H.R.
11. One of the separately numbered companion House bills was H.R. 1840
which was introduced by Representative Byron Rogers (D., Colorado). All
of these bills were promptly referred to the Committees on the Judiciary in
the House and the Senate, since those committees are the legislating committees respecting the Clayton Act. Throughout the first session of the 84th
Congress, the Judiciary Committees made no move to hold hearings or to
report upon H.R. 11 and S. 11. Therefore, shortly after the opening of the
second session of the 84th Congress in January 1956, Mr. Patman requested
the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
to promptly hold hearings and report H.R. 11. Hearings were then scheduled
but not to be held before April 18-20, 1956. Thereupon, Mr. Patman on
February 28, 1956, introduced House Resolution 414. That resolution provided for moving that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of bill, H.R. 11.
The rules of the House provide that when such resolution has remained
on file with the Committee on Rules for seven Legislative Days the author
of the Resolution may file a petition to discharge committees from further
consideration of the bill in question; in this instance H.R. 11. In filing that
petition Mr. Patman stated:
"Since the Committee on the Judiciary has not to date granted a hearing
on the bill (H.R. 11) and has set it down for April 18-20 for a hearing before
a subcommittee, which I believe is too late for effective action at this Session
of Congress, those of us who are authors of this proposal are filing a petition
under the rules to force consideration. The petition will be available for
signatures of the Members of the House, Monday, March 12, 1956." 102 CONO.
REc. 3845 (daily ed. March 8, 1956).
Of course, the rules require that in order for such petition to be effective
it would have to be signed by 218 members or a constitutional majority of
all the members of the House. As is shown by 102 CONG. REC. 7734-35 (daily
ed. May 21, 1956), Mr. Patman was successful in securing the 218th signature to the petition. Three days later, on May 24, 1956, the Committee on
the Judiciary submitted to the House, Report No. 2202, accompanying H.R.
1840 (one of the companion bills of H.R. 11), recommending "that the bill
do pass." That report contains the following statement:
"Price discriminations favoring preferred buyers present a danger to
the competitive enterprise system which is inconsistent with the policy of
the price discrimination statute. Firms can abuse their superior market
position and engage in discriminatory practices that eliminate small suppliers and small retailers from the competitive scene. In practical effect
the law as presently construed allows the private interests of a discriminator
to outweigh the public interest in preserving competitive opportunity at all
levels of business activity. H.R. 1840 would reassert that the public interest
in protecting the economy against discriminations which may substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly must prevail over private
interests served by discrimination."
and concluded with the following statement:
"CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
"In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the House of Representatives,
there is printed below, in roman, existing law in which no new change is
proposed; the matter proposed to be stricken out is enclosed in black
brackets, and new matter proposed to be added is shown in italics:
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antimonopoly public policy, even though the architect of such practices had some good, though misguided, purposes in mind. For example, mergers of corporations which destroy competition violate the
antimerger law 2 even though based on good intentions and for good
purposes. In criminal causes, to be sure, evidence of intent is relevant
to the issue. Here, we are not discussing proposals for amending the
Criminal Code. Instead, we are discussing legislative proposals out
of which only civil actions may arise.

THE PRACTICE OF PRICE DISCRvrnmATIoN REPEATEDLY HAS BEEN FOUND
To BE MONOPOLISTIC AND CONGRESS HAS DETERmINED IT SHOULD
BE CURBED

The extent to which we have free competitive enterprise in the
United States is due to deep-rooted hostility toward monopolies, business combinations and monopolistic practices which resulted in Congressional investigations of "trusts" in the period from 1875 to 1890
and thereafter.
SECTION 2 (B) OF AN ACT APPROVED OCTOBER 15, 1914, AS AMRENDED
(15 U.S.C. 13 (B))
"SEC. 2 (b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint
under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services
or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made
by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation
of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the
Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination:
Provided, however, [That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima facie case thus made by showing] That unless the effect
of the discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce it shall be a complete defense
for a seller to show that his lower price or the furnishing of services or
facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by
a competitor."
The bill then came up for debate and vote by the House on June 11, 1956,
at which time it passed overwhelmingly by the vote of 394 yeas, 3 nays and
35 not voting (102 CONG. REc. 10,051 (daily ed. June 11, 1956)). The matter
then was considered by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and was
reported favorably by that Committee in Senate Report No. 2814, on July 27,
1956. But since that was the date on which the Senate adjourned sine die for
the 84th Congress, the bill failed to receive consideration on the Floor of the
Senate. The rules provide that a report of that nature cannot be taken up
on the same day it is made without unanimous consent. Since Senator Bricker
of Ohio (R.) objected to the bill receiving consideration, he prevented it from
being taken up.
On January 3, 1957, at the opening of the 85th Congress, Representative
Patman (D., Texas) re-introduced the same bill in the House, and likewise
Senator Kefauver introduced again a companion bill in the Senate at the
same time. By coincidence, Mr. Patman's bill in the House in the 85th Congress
also bears the number H.R. 11 and Senator Kefauver's bill in the Senate the
number S. 11. During March, April and May 1957 the Antitrust Subcommittee
of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, held hearings on S.
11 and reported the bill to the Full Committee. The Full Committee did not
act on the bill before the 1st session of the 85th Congress ended. The House
Judiciary Committee has not held hearings on H.R. 11 in the 85th Congress.
2. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1952).
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The first monopolistic use of the trust device was by the Standard
Oil Company. Prior to 1875 J. D. Rockefeller and his associates, who
owned the Standard Oil Enterprises, had acquired a large number of
concerns whose stocks were registered in the names of various individuals who held them for the benefit of Standard Oil. In order to
effectuate the control of those companies, the Standard Oil trust was
organized in 1879. It encompassed about forty companies which controlled from ninety to ninety-five percent of the oil refining capacity
in the United States. Thus, what had started out as a small company,
in the period 1860 to 1865, as only one of about 30 refining companies,
had by 1879 grown to a position of powerful monopoly control over
an industry.
During the course of its investigations of "trusts," Congress found
that Standard, after having merged with its competitors to gain a big
size advantage over its remaining competitors, then acted to abuse its
great economic power. Standard's favorite means of expressing its
abuse of overpowering economic position was the use of the practice
of price discrimination. It would go into the territory of one of its
small competitors and cut the price in that territory to "meet the
competition" of that small competitor. At the same time, Standard
would hold its prices higher in another area. When the small competitor in the area where the price had been lowered had been driven
out of business, Standard then would raise the price in that territory
and move on to the territory of another competitor to "meet competition" and in doing so would again discriminate in price. The more
monopoly control Standard acquired through the practice of price
discrimination, the easier it became for it to drive out of business other
small competitors through cutting the price to "meet competition,"
and in some instances "beating competition," in the individual local
territories of such competitors.
In its investigation of "trusts," Congress found that the trail blazed
by Standard in the petroleum industry had shown the way to monopolists and would-be-monopolists in other industries who quickly proceeded to imitate Standard's practice of price discrimination.
In that setting, Congress, in 1890, enacted the Sherman Act forbidding "trusts." And thereafter, in 1911, the Supreme Court of the
United States approved an action brought by the Government under
the Sherman Act to subdivide the Standard Oil Company.3
The order of the Court in breaking up the Standard Oil trust did
not provide for ending Standard Oil's practice of price discrimination.
In fact the Sherman Act contains no provision prohibiting that practice. Therefore, it is not strange that Standard's attorneys argued in
1911 that the Court should not order a breakup of Standard's monopoly
3. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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which had been acquired in "good faith" and through the lawful means
4
of price discrimination.
Those in and out of Government who feared the consequences of
monopoly and its restriction upon economic freedom and political
liberties cried out for additional legislation to curb monopolistic practices. They regarded as senseless any policy which simply provided
for building up and then breaking up monopolies.
The leaders of political parties promptly responded to the expression of public opinion that laws should be enacted against specific acts and practices which produced monopolies rather than waiting for monopolies to grow into full flower, with an understanding
that an attempt would then be made to dissolve the monopolies. Strong
promises were made to "small business." "Antimonopoly" planks
appeared in the platform of all three major parties participating in the
1912 presidential campaign. The Democrats won over the regular
Republican Party and the "Bull Moose" Republican Party on that
occasion. In the Democratic platform there was a promise launched
against the monopolistic practices in the following words: "The prevention of holding companies, of interlocking directorates, of stockwatering, of discriminations in price, and the control by any one
corporation of so large a proportion of any industry as to make it a
menace to competitive conditions."5
At the opening of the Sixty-Third Congress in 1913, President Wilson, in one of his first messages, called for legislation to prohibit
price discrimination and other unfair trade practices. In that connection he said:
We are sufficiently familiar with the actual processes and methods of
monopoly and of the many hurtful restraints of trade to make definition
possible, at any rate up to the limit of which experience has disclosed.
These practices, being now abundantly disclosed, can be explicitly and
item by item forbidden by statute in such terms as will practically
eliminate uncertainty, the law itself and the penalty being made equally
plain.
The public became aroused and public opinion called for legislation
that would outlaw price discrimination and other specific acts and
practices that had led to monopoly and monopolistic conditions.
4. The attorneys argued that: "[Defendant's] control was but the result
of lawful competitive methods, guided by economic genius of the higher
order, sustained by courage, by a keen insight into commercial situations,
resulting in the acquisition of great wealth, but at the same time serving to
stimulate and increase production, to widely extend the distribution of the
products of petroleum at a cost largely below that which would have otherwise prevailed, thus proving to be at one and the same time a benefaction
to the general public as well as of enormous advantage to individuals." Id.
at 84.
5. Democratic Party Platform, 1912.
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Mr. Brandeis, later Justice Brandeis, testified in 1914 that price discrimination was the most powerful weapon that the Standard Oil
Company had utilized in its march to monopoly. 6
Congress responded by enacting the Federal Trade Commission
Act,7 which declared unfair methods of competition to be unlawful,
and the Clayton Antitrust Act, 8 which prohibited price discrimination,
exclusive dealing, acquisition of stock by one corporation of another
and interlocking directorates, where the effect would be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in a line of commerce. President Wilson was highly elated over the prospects for
effective action against monopolistic conditions. 9
However, the public and particularly small business enterprises
had an unpleasant surprise ahead. It was found that somehow,
someone had slipped into the anti-discrimination provision of section 2 of the Clayton Antitrust Act the proviso which made that section of the law unoperative against price discriminations when made
"in good faith to meet competition." When that proviso was being
debated in Congress, concern was expressed about the possibility of it
6. At the hearing on H.R. 11380, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, Mr. Louis D.
Brandeis, who later became a Justice of the Supreme Court, testified as follows:
"MR. BRANDEIS.... to get a monopoly by getting a competitor out of the
way. That is not competition; that is destruction. It is not the puroose of
competition at all; it is destruction. Now, it seems to me perfectly clear, as
a general proposition, that what we must do in dealing with business, with
the liberty of a business, is precisely the same as what we must do in liberty
of the individual. Any one of us might be knocked down when we go through
the streets by somebody who is a good deal stronger than we are. I am certain I might be so knocked down. The law undertakes to restrain the liberty
of that physically strong individual by not allowing him to exercise his
right to do as he pleases and prevent his knocking me down, unless it should
be in self-defense or in some other justification or infringement of his rights.
What is done there? That is the regulation, the restriction, of the liberty of
one which is absolutely essential to the preservation of the liberty of the
other. Now, that same principle applies, of course, in business. If a man who
is strong, who has the endurance which comes with size and with wealth,
is allowed to use that against an individual, that is not competition. Competition consists in being able to do the thing better-either cheaper or in
quality better, in service better-than the other person; that is competition.
The Standard Oil Co., did not-compete with those individuals when it went
in and destroyed them. They committed industrial murder just as much as
the man who physically used his strength to put an end to the persons about
him."
7. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §41 (1952).
8. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952).

9. Shortly after President Wilson signed the Clayton Antitrust Act and the
Federal Trade Commission Act, he wrote in a private letter:
"With similar purpose and in a like temper the Congress has sought, in the
Trade Commission bill and in the Clayton bill, to make men in a small way
of business as free to succeed as men in a big way, and to kill monopoly in
the seed .... It is our purpose to destroy monopoly and maintain competition
as an only effectual instrument of business liberty.... Letter of Woodrow
Wilson, October 17, 1914, in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 18990 (1925-27).
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"pulling the teeth" from the law.10 However, it was denied that it
would have that effect.
The fears which had been expressed about the possible effect of
the "good faith" proviso in the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 proved
to be well founded. In the twenty-year period following the passage
of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 it proved to be an ineffective tool
10. The Clayton Act of 1914 originated with the bill H.R. 15657, introduced

by Mr. Clayton on April 14, 1914, 51 CoNG. REc. 6714 (1914). Section 2 of
this bill prohibited discrimination in price between different purchasers, with
the purpose or intent to destroy or wrongfully injure the business of a
competitor of either the purchaser or the seller. Section 2 did not contain
any proviso excepting discriminations made in good faith to meet competition.
H.R. 15657 was reported out on May 6, 1914, and the report, H.R. No. 627,
63d Cong., 2d Sess., 8-9, showed that the § 2 prohibition of price discrimination was confined to a well-known, common, particular form of discrimination.
Thus, the report stated, in part:
"Section 2 of the bill is intended to prevent unfair discrimination. 'The
necessity for legislation needs little argument to sustain the wisdom of it.
In the past it has been a most common practice of great and powerful combinations engaged in commerce-notably the Standard Oil Co., and the
American Tobacco Co., and others of less notoriety, but of great influenceto lower prices of their commodities, oftentimes below the cost of prices of
production in certain communities and sections where they had competition,
with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their competitors, and with the ultimate purpose in view of thereby acquiring a
monopoly in the particular locality or section in which the discriminating
price is made. Every concern that engages in this evil practice must of
necessity recoup its losses in the particular communities or sections where
their commodities are sold below cost or without a fair profit by raising
the price of the same class of commodities above their fair market value in
other sections or communities. Such a system or practice is so manifestly unfair and unjust, not only to competitors who are directly injured thereby

but to the general public, that your committee is strongly of the opinion

that the present antitrust laws ought to be supplemented by making this
particular form of discrimination a specific offense under the law when
practiced by those engaged in commerce."
S. Doc. No. 583, 63 Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). Made the same statement for
the Senate Judiciary Committee in its report on H.R. 15657.
In its report upon the bill to enact the Clayton Act-S. REP. No. 695, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1914), to accompany H.R. 15657, the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary said:
"Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and
monopolies, seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices
which, as a rule, singly and in themselves are not covered by the act of
July 2, 1890 (the Sherman Act) or other existing antitrust acts and thus, by
making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies,
and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation."
During the debate on the bill in the Senate, the following identification
was made of the particular form of discrimination to be prohibited by §2:
"MR. WALSH .... Section 2 refers to that form of unfair competition generally denominated as local price cutting ....
Perhaps the most conspicuous offender in the matter of unfair competition
by local price cutting has been the great Standard Oil Co.", 51 CoNG. REc.
14099 (1914).
With this evidence before us showing that the section 2 prohibition was
confined to a "particular form of discrimination," the debates in the House

and the Senate make it clear that the "good faith meeting of competition'!
proviso, when it was later inserted in the bill by the Senate Judiciary Committee, was not understood or intended by Congress to legalize discriminations that were prohibited. Thus, the following colloquy occurred during
the debate in the House:
'MR. STAFFORD. As I understand it, the purpose here is to provide a
uniform price for all persons and customers for the same quality of goods?
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for use against destructive price discriminations. As pointed out
herein, the Federal Trade Commission made many investigations and
reported that the practice of price discrimination was widespread,
that it was leading to the creation of monopolistic conditions and that
"The Commission has no evidence which would establish that price
discrimination by chain stores has not been in good faith to meet com"MR. WEBB. And under like conditions.
"MR. STAFFORD. About which there cannot be any competition at all,
so far as the seller is concerned, in meeting the competition of some other
corporation?
"MR. WEBB. Oh, yes; if he meets the competition of some other person,
he is not meeting that competition for the purpose of destroying or wrongfully injuring his competition." 51 CONG. REc. 9096 (1914).
"MR. GRAHAM (of Pennsylvania), Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer an
amendment . . . [The clerk read] after the word 'shall', insert the words
'except in lawfully meeting competition'. . ." Id. at 9389.
"It has been held in some of the cases that have been tried that wherever
prices are cut below cost that is unfair trade practice; but where a man meets
another's price in protecting his business in a district with a price, it is his
lawful right and privilege, and it is the object of competition that he should
meet his price ...

."

Ibid.

"MR. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, we hope this amendment will not be adopted,

because in our opinion it adds nothing to the section. We think under the
provisions of the section any man who honestly meets competition is not
thereby intending to destroy or wrongfully injure any other person. If that
is his object, meeting honest competition, this section will not hurt him.
Ibid.

"MR. GARDNER. Would the adoption of the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Graham] open the door to the practices
which you seek to prevent by section 2?"
"MR. WEBB. It might be a suggestion to the parties that that could be
done.... I oppose the amendment because, as I have said, I think the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania is useless and unnecessary."
The question was taken, and the amendment was rejected Id. at 9390.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary added a good faith meeting of
competition provision to § 2 of the House bill so that the § 2 prohibition would
not prevent "discrimination in price in the same or different communities made
in good faith to meet competition and not intended to create monopoly."
The Senate committee report, S. RE?. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44
(1914), explained this addition as follows:
"After full consideration it is deemed advisable to enlarge the exception
in the first proviso to the section by adding... 'discrimination in price made
m good faith to meet competition and not intended to create monopoly'
upon the ground that the enlargement will tend to foster wholesome competition."
The debate in the Senate on H.R. 15667 as amended by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, included the following regarding section 2:
"IVIR. CUMMINS....
Made in good faith to meet competition....
Imagine the Government endeavoring to prove that a particular instance
of price cutting was not made in good faith to meet competition ..

"

51

CONG. REC. 14228 (1914).
"MR. REED.... Manifestly, if two men are in competition at a given placelet us say the Standard Oil Co. and an independent company-and the independent company should drop the price of gasoline to 11 cents, and the
Standard Oil Co. should meet it, that would be an act done in good faith to
meet competition. If, however, the Standard Oil Co. were to drop the price
of gasoline to 5 cents, a price less than the article could be produced for,
and kept it up to 11 or 12 cents somewhere else, and carried it out and kept
it up so that it drove the independent concern out of business, there would
not be any difficulty at all in a jury finding that they did not do it in good
faith. I will undertake, in any reasonably plain case, any outrageous case,
to get a verdict every time under that section." Ibid.
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petition and there is good ground to conclude that in many cases
it has been for that purpose."'1
It was easy to see why the big chains were driving the independents
out. They were getting price concessions and secret rebates far beyond anything that was justified by the suppliers' cost differences.
The investigations revealed, for example, that prior to 1935 the
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company had been receiving on an annual basis
$6 million in off-the-invoice discounts and another $2 million a year
in brokerage fees on its purchases.
In many instances the big chains were demanding special price
concessions and coercing small suppliers into granting special concessions, with threats of putting up their own manufacturing plants. In
other instances they were playing the suppliers off against one another,
forcing suppliers of nationally advertised products to meet the prices
of small, exclusive suppliers who could not, in practice, market to the
independent trade. It was overwhelmingly obvious that something
had to be done to check this abuse of power and return the competitive
contest more to a contest of efficiency.
The Federal Trade Commission, in its Final Report on the Chain
Store Investigation,2 stated that the Clayton Antitrust Act, as then
written, permitted destructive price discriminations "when made in
good faith to meet competition." The Commission reported that such
'"R. CUMMINS. . . . [B]ut we are not making this law to arrest the
progress of monopoly in outrageous cases only. We are making it to preserve
competition." Ibid.
"We might just as well have said ... that the seller can do anything that
he desires or pleases to meet competition that is not in violation of the antitrust laws; if it is in violation of the anti-trust law, we need no further condemnation or penalty. We have wound up this section practically by saying
that the seller can do whatsoever he pleases with regard to his business,
provided he does not violate the antitrust law; and yet this is one of the sections that have been proposed to strengthen the antitrust law, to add to
the antitrust law, to accomplish the purpose of the antitrust law by forbidding
something that is not now forbidden by the States." Id. at 14250.
The conference report, S. Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), eliminated
from the good faith proviso the language "and not intended to create monopoly." 51 CONG. REc. 15637 (1914). During the debate on the conference
report in the Senate, the following criticisms of the good faith proviso were
made:
'"R. STERLING... . Passing the paragraph or proviso which permits
discrimination in price because of differences in grade, quality, or quantity,
or differences in cost of selling or transportation, I come to this significant
provision injected by the committee, namely, the provision which permits
'discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good
faith to meet competition.' It is easy to conceive of the multitude of sins
that may be covered by that broad and generous cloak.... ." Id. at 16115.

"Think of it. It can always be urged against the charge of unlawful discrimination that it was done for the purpose of meeting competition. 'We
found our competition charging a certain price for these goods.' We cut the
price of ours, below cost even, to meet his competition. What have you got
to say about it under this law?"
11. FTC, Final Report on the Chain Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1934).
12. Ibid.
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"good faith" provision of the law, as then interpreted, virtually nullified the law against price discriminations. The Commission, that connection, commented:
A simple solution for the uncertainties and difficulties of enforcement
would be to prohibit unfair and unjust discrimination in price and leave
it to the enforcement agency, subject to review by the courts, to apply
that principle to particular cases and situations. The soundness of and
valid defenses
the extent to which the present provisos would constitute
13
would thus become a judicial and not a legislative matter.
The Commission, in its report on the chain store investigation,
rejected suggestions that the Sherman Antitrust Act be relied upon
and used to halt these destructive price discriminations. 14 One thing
was clear. Something had to be done, and done without too much
delay. Therefore, resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives providing for an investigation of the trade practices of
big-scale retail and wholesale buying and selling organizations.' 5
Those resolutions provided for the investigations to be made by a
Special Committee of seven Members of the House; four Democrats
and three Republicans, under the chairmanship of the author. 6
When this practice was being investigated in 1935-1936, it was
found that injurious price discriminations were being practiced in
industry after industry. Big suppliers were discriminating in their
prices, either to undercut the smaller companies or to meet the prices
of the local companies. Sometimes the big companies would meet
the price of local companies to put them out of business, and sometimes to make them raise their prices. Where a big company found
that a local competitor was selling below its national price, it would
meet the price in that area, and if the local company did not show
signs of going out of business, then the game of raising prices would
start. The big company would lower the boom for a while and then
raise it again. If the local company failed to raise its price promptly,
then the boom would be lowered again. Before long, after a few
13. Id. at 96. The Commission recommended the following language as a
prohibition against price discrimination: "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in any transaction in or affecting such commerce, either
directly or indirectly to discriminate unfairly or injustly in price between
different purchasers of commodities, which commodities are sold for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or
the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the
jurisdiction of the United States."
14. "While price discrimination was one of the methods used to build up the
monopoly which the Supreme Court held unlawful in the Standard Oil dissolution suit, it has never been held to be a violation of the Sherman Act
in and of itself." Id. at 65.
15. H.R. RES. 203 and 239, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934).
16. Rep. Wright Patman (D., Texas), Chairman; Rep. Sol Bloom (D.,
N.Y.); Rep. Scott W. Lucas (D., Ill.); Rep. John F. Dockweiler (D., Calif.);
Rep. Donald H. McLean (R., N.J.); Rep. W. Sterling Cole (R., N.Y.); Rep.
Gerald J. Boileau (R., Wisc.).

1958]

FOR H. R. 11 AND S. 11

ups and downs, the local company would catch on to the fact that it
had better raise up to the big competitor's price. Since the big
competitor would not permit local companies to have more than
a certain share of the local market, the only profitable thing they
could do was to raise their prices up to the big supplier's price.
Under the foregoing circumstances, no supplier had any real independence to reduce his price. Discrimination made it so easy for
the big competitors to meet his price, and he knew they would meet
his price, and hence he knew he could only lose money and not gain
any volume of business by reducing his price.
Today, there are only three or four or perhaps one or two big suppliers in each industry which have any genuine independence to reduce prices. This is the centralized control over prices maintained by
discrimination, which is aimed at the elimination of sellers who attempt to initiate independent price behavior. This is not competition
in any realistic sense. This is soft competition.
In the light of the facts uncovered during the course of investigations
of big-scale buying and selling in 1935-1936, it was not difficult for one
to see why the law against price discrimination had broken down.
One of the main reasons was the defect in the law pointed out by
the Federal Trade Commission in its report on the chain store investigation. That defect was the provision which allowed the sellers
who were discriminating in price to defend on the ground that they
were meeting competition in good faith. We whio were in the Congress at the time immediately moved to remedy this situation. Bills
were introduced in both the House and the Senate to overcome the
defects in the laws against price discrimination, including the loophole which permitted discriminations "made in good faith to meet
competition."'1
During the winter of 1935-1936 extensive hearings were held by
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives and the
Judiciary Committee of the Senate on the proposals to strengthen
the laws against destructive price discriminations. Representatives
of the larger corporations which had been practicing price discrimination voiced strong opposition to the proposals to strengthen the
laws against price discrimination.
It is not difficult to see why the big corporations do not like the
anti-discrimination law. These corporations are at the top of the heap,
and because of their greater size may find it possible to exercise an
unfair advantage over their smaller competitors. ,Many of these giant
corporations are fat and lazy, and they would not'like to have to
compete with smaller companies on the basis of efficiency. Many of
17. H.R. 8442 (Introduced by Rep. Wright Patman

(D., Texas.))

and

S. 2154 (Introduced by Senator Joseph Robinson (D., Ark.)), 74th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1935).

"
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them know that if they did have to compete on equal terms the
smaller companies would run rings around them.
Many of the big corporations are inefficient. They have a large
number of high-priced vice presidents; they have huge advertising
and political expenses; and, worst of all, they are snarled up in more
bureaucratic red tape than the worst Government bureau we ever had.
Many of the managements do not know who their own people are,
and most of the underlings have to spend their time making up elaborate reports and reading regulations to find out what authority they
have to do what. All of this takes time and money that might be spent
in productive work.
Despite all of the opposition that the opponents could muster
to the proposals for strengthening our laws against price discriminations, the Judiciary Committee of the House and the Judiciary
Committee of the Senate reported favorably on the Robinson and
the Patman bills and recommended their enactment into law.
The bill introduced in the Senate and reported by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary followed the FTC's recommendation
literally in that it contained no reference whatever to "good faith"
or to "meeting of competition." The House bill, on the other hand
contained the language of the statute today. The Senate bill was
amended on the floor of the House by insertion of the "good faith"
clause of the old Clayton Act. The conference committee agreed upon
the language of the House bill.
The Conference Report to the House on the resolution of the
differences between the Senate and the House bills, is quite significant on the "good faith" proviso in the light of subsequent developments. That is particularly true in view of the fact that the
Supreme Court, in the Standard Oil case,18 held that the "good faith"
defense provides an absolute bar to a proceeding against price discrimination.
Mr. Utterback was the Chairman of the Conferees for the House,
and therefore not only presented the Conference Report to the House
but also served as manager of the bill when it was reported to the
House by the Conference Committee for consideration.
With reference to the "good faith" provision, the Conference Report contained the following statement:
The Senate bill contained a further proviso-That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good faith to meet competition.
This language is found in existing law, and in the opinion of the conferees is one of the obstacles to enforcement of the present Clayton Act.
The Senate receded, and the language is stricken. A provision relating
18. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1950).
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to the question of meeting competition, intended to operate only as a rule
of evidence in a proceeding before the Federal Trade Cpmmision, is included in subsection (b) .... (Emphasis added.) 19
That aspect of the Conference Report on the bill which became the
Robinson-Patman Act was further explained by Mr. Utterback, the
manager of the House Conferees in the following language:
This does not set up the meeting of competition as an absolute bar
to a charge of discrimination under the bill. It merely permits it to be
shown in evidence. This provision is entirely procedural. It does not determine substantive rights, liabilities, and duties. They are fixed in the
other provisions of the bill. It leaves it a question of fact to be determined
in each case, whether the competition to be met was such as to justify
the discrimination given, as one lying within the limitations laid down
by the bill, and whether the way in which the competition was met
lies within the latitude allowed by those limitations. 20
Above all else, the Congress meant to correct the defect in the
law which permitted destructive discriminations "in good faith to
meet competition." Therefore, Mr. Utterback, the manager for the
bill on the House floor, stressed the point that the "good faith" proviso
as agreed upon by the Conference Committee was not to serve as an
absolute bar to a charge of price discrimination. He pointed out
21
that instead it was to be merely a rule of evidence.
Therefore, it was made clear that the Congress never intended
the "good faith" proviso to be construed as a carte blanche exemption
to violate the bill so long as a competitor could be shown to have violated it first. Particular care was exercised to make clear that the
law was not to be used in practices of oppressive discriminations in
violation of the obvious intent of the bill.
With the need for remedial legislation so urgent,2 the Congress
19. H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7 (1935) (on H.R. 8442).
20. 80 CONG. REC. 9418 (daily ed. June 15, 1936).
21. Ibid. In that connection, r. Utterback explained the point as follows:
"In connection with the above rule as the burden of proof, it is also provided
that a seller may show that his lower price was made in good faith to meet
an equally low price of the competitor, or that his furnishing of services or
facilities was made in good faith to meet those furnished by a competitor.
It is to be noted, however, that this does not set up the meeting of competition as an absolute bar to a charge of discrimination under the bill. It merely
permits it to be shown in evidence. This provision is entirely procedural.
It does not determine substantive rights, liabilities, and duties. They are
fixed in the other provisions of the bill. It leaves it a question of fact to be
determined in each case, whether the competition to be met was such as to
justify the discrimination given, as one lying within the limitations laid down
by the bill, and whether the way in which the competition was met lies within
the latitude allowed by those limitations."
22. The House Committee Report on the need for the legislation stated:
"Your committee is of the opinion that the evidence is overwhelming that
price discrimination practices exist to such an extent that the survival of independent merchants, manufacturers, and other businessmen is seriously imperiled and that remedial legislation is necessary." H.R. REP. No. 2287,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1935) (on H.R. 8442).
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acted not only in a manner to make its intent clear, but also with a
large emphatic vote. For example, the Robinson-Patman Act passed
the House by a vote of 290 to 16 and when it was finally voted on in
the Senate it was passed without objection.
A few of the facts relating to the passage of the Robinson-Patman
Act have been cited to demonstrate that in effect the whole Seventyfourth Congress accepted its responsibility and met one of the really
serious problems of the day when it strengthened the laws against
destructive price discrimination.
It was thought that with the enactment of the Robinson-Patman
law Congress would not be called upon to deal with this problem
again. If the clear intent of the Congress had been followed in the
interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act, it is not believed that
Congress would now have before it for consideration additional legislative proposals to strengthen the Robinson-Patman Act. How then
does it happen that in the Eighty Fourth Congress and again in the
Eighty Fifth Congress bills have been introduced to strengthen the
Robinson-Patman Act against destructive price discriminations?
H. R. 11 AD S. 11
In 1951 the Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion and
decision held that a giant concern, such as Standard Oil Company of
Indiana, is now privileged to discriminate in price with the effect of
destroying its competitors, destroying its customers, substantially
lessening competition and tending to create a monopoly so long as
that giant concern shows that it has accomplished all of those things
in "good faith" in meeting an equally low price of a competitor.23
The decision of the Supreme Court referred to was handed down
in what has now come to be known as the Standard Oil case. The
Federal Trade Commission initiated that case through issuance of
a complaint charging the respondent, Standard Oil Company of Indiana, with price discrimination in the sale of gasoline in the Detroit
Metropolitan Area in violation of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act.2 4
In that complaint, it was alleged that Standard had regularly sold
at a "tank car" price to four large gasoline dealers (each of which
made substantial retail sales-although some also made sales at
wholesale). In addition, it was alleged that Standard at the same
time was selling gasoline at higher "tank wagon" prices to numerous
other gasoline dealers, totaling about 358, who were competing with
the four favored large dealers in the same area. The complaint further
alleged that the effect of the discrimination had been to injure,
destroy or prevent competition between the favored and the nonORIGIN OF THE NEED FOR

23. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
24. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
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favored dealers in the sale of gasoline directly to the consuming public.
Standard's answer to the complaint admitted that it had engaged
in the practice of selling to its 358 small retailer customers in the
Detroit area at higher prices than it had been selling to four large
favored competing dealers in that area. It sought to justify its practice of charging the different prices to different dealers mainly on
three grounds: (1) that the four large sellers had been classed as
"jobber" dealers by Standard by virtue of the larger quantities in
which they bought and the manner in which they performed their
functions; (2) that the different prices that Standard had charged
were justified on a basis of differences in costs in servicing the different
dealers; and (3) that the lower prices charged the favored dealers
had been made in "good faith" to meet the equally low or lower prices
of competitors of Standard.
Before discussing additional facts about this practice of price discrimination and its effects, perhaps it would be helpful to refer generally and briefly to the relative size of each of the actors in this little
drama of price discrimination in the Detroit area with which that case
was concerned.
According to published data, the Standard Oil Company of Indiana
is one of the large corporations, doing a world-wide business in refining, transporting, selling and distributing petroleum products, including gasoline. It is the leader in that field of business in one section of
the United States. Its principal business is carried on in eleven midwestern states, including Michigan and the metropolitan area of Detroit. According to a survey made by Fortune Magazine, based on
statistics for 1956, Standard Oil Company of Indiana ranked ninth in
industrial corporations in the United States, with assets of $2,437,196,000.25 In the same year, its sales totaled $1,890,228,000. A number
of its competitors engaged in the sale of gasoline to "jobbers" and to
"retailers," in the Detroit metropolitan area, were not large enough
to be rated among Fortune's listing of 500 largest industrial companies. In fact, many of Standard's competitors are so small that they
are not known generally except within the particular local areas in
which they operate. For example, in the Detroit metropolitan area one
competitor, the Red Indian Oil Company, was engaged in. selling a
brand of gasoline known as "Fleet Wing." Few people outside of
that area have heard of that company or its brand.
Likewise, great disparity existed in the size of Standard's customers.
Those from -whom Standard exacted the higher price in its conduct
of the challenged discriminatory practice were small retail gasoline
dealers. Most of those were operating only one gasoline station each.
In contrast, the four gasoline dealers who were favored by Standard
25. 500 Industrials,Fortune Magazine, July 1957.
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in that situation were large dealers. For example, each of four favored
dealers was handling from one to four million gallons of gasoline per
year.
In the course of the proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission, Standard failed to justify its practice of charging different
prices to its different competing customers in the Detroit area on any
basis of differences in costs of servicing those customers. Also, it
failed to show that the four favored customers were engaged strictly
as "jobbers" in the sale of gasoline. On the contrary, it was shown that
those four favored customers were reselling gasoline at retail in
competition with the 358 other customers.
Since Standard's defenses, based on the claim of cost justification
and on the claim that its favored customers were operating strictly
as "jobbers," had not prevailed, it then placed its reliance upon evidence offered to show that its lower prices were made in order to
retain those customers and in good faith to meet an equally low
price made by one or more competitors. 26 It has been pointed out that
Standard's competitors in the Detroit area, whose competition it
allegedly was attempting to meet, were mere pigmies in comparison
with the giant Standard Oil Company of Indiana. They included such
small and relatively unknown companies as the Aurora Oil Company, the National Refining Company, the Red Indian Oil Company
and the Stikeman Oil Company.27 These small companies, which
were for the most part only doing business in Michigan and the
Detroit area, were selling off-brand and unadvertised gasoline. One
used the brand named "Fleet Wing," but it was not a widely advertised brand.
In view of these circumstances, Standard did not allege or attempt
to prove that the small local competitors, whose prices it was attempting to meet, were in any position to seriously threaten the
market position of the giant Standard Oil Company of Indiana in its
fields of operations. Moreover, Standard did not allege or attempt
to prove that the small local competitors whose prices it was attempting to meet were engaged in any unlawful or discriminatory
conduct. On the contrary, the evidence was to the effect that the
conduct and the prices of Standard's competitors were nondiscriminatory and lawful.28 In other words, Standard undertook to defend
its discriminatory pricing practices by showing that some small local
competitors, who were conducting their business lawfully, were making lower, nondiscriminatory price offers to the buyers. Therefore,
Standard sought to have excused from the application of the law
26. 340 U.S. at 236.
27. Transcript of Record, pp. 3274, 5278, 1163, 5060, Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956).
28. 340 U.S. at 238.
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its own discriminatory conduct, even though that conduct had the
effect of "substantially lessening competition and injuring, destroying and preventing competition."29 Its effort in that respect was based
on the reasoning that it should be permitted to defend itself from the
price action of its small local competitors, even though they were
conducting themselves lawfully. When the full impact of that line
of reasoning is felt and realized, the average lawyer will be startled
by it. It is something new in the way of an argument for excusing
wrongful conduct from the application of the law. Ordinarily, injurious action is excusable as a matter of self-defense against unlawful action.
The Federal Trade Commission ruled that since the evidence had
been established that Standard's discriminatory practices had the
effect of "substantially lessening competition and injuring, destroying
and preventing competition," and had therefore established so conclusively a case against Standard, it did not consider that the "good
faith" defense was an
absolute defense to a charge of unlawful discrimination and proof of
meeting a competitor's equally low price can be availed of only to the
extent it may rebut the prima facie case. The meeting of the equally
low price of a competitor in good faith is not a defense to a charge of price
discrimination where competitive injury is affirmatively shown and so
replaces the rebuttable presumption of the prima facie case. 0
Therefore, the Commission concluded that under such circumstances,
"the proviso of Section 2 (b) does not constitute a substantive justification or defense" and that under such section a defense was "not
available to the respondent on the basis of the present record."'
Accordingly, the Commission, on the basis of its findings and conclusion, entered a Cease and Desist Order, commanding Standard to discontinue the unlawful discriminations in price.3 2
On the petition for review, in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, Standard contended that the Commission had erred in its
ruling that section 2 (b), the "good faith" defense, was not absolute.
The circuit court agreed with the Commission and approved its findings
and conclusions and, although it made some modifications in the
Commission's Order to Cease and Desist, it then affirmed the Commission's Order.33
29.
30.
31.
32.

Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 276 (1945).
Id. at 282.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 283-85. See also modifications made in the Cease and Desist

Order, Standard Oil Co., 43 F.T.C. 56-57 (1946).

33. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949).
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The circuit court, in disposing of the matter, stated:
We agree with the Commission that the showing of the petitioner that

it made the discriminatory price in good faith to meet competition is not
controlling in view of the very substantial evidence that its discrimination was used to affect and lessen competition at the retail level.34
Thereupon Standard sought and secured in the Supreme Court a
review of that decision. The Supreme Court approved Standard's
contention that the 2 (b) "good faith" defense proviso does afford an
absolute defense to a charge of price discrimination, irrespective of
the fact that the discrimination had been found, as a matter of fact,
35
to have the effect of substantially lessening competition.
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and the Federal Trade Commission and remanded
the case to the Commission to make findings regarding the facts which
would show whether or not Standard's lower prices were made in
good faith to meet the equally low prices of competitors. In explaining
the basis for its ruling, the Court reasoned and stated that the "good
faith" defense provided for in section 2 (b) should be given faith and
credit "without regard to whether there also appears an affirmative
showing of actual or potential injury to competition at the same or a
lower level traceable to the price differential made by the seller,"3 6
and then stated that "we may, therefore, conclude that Congress
meant to permit the natural consequences to follow the seller's action
in meeting in good faith a lawful and equally low price of its competi37
tor.,
Actually, a substantial part of the basis for the Court's reasoning,
opinion and decision appeared to be based upon arguments appearing
in law review articles in opposition to the Clayton Act provisions
against price discrimination as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act.38 That aspect of the matter will be dealt with in greater detail
later in this article.
The decision by the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case was by
a vote of four-to-three. Justice Minton did not participate because he
had participated in the earlier decision of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. Justice Reed wrote a sharp dissent for himself, Chief
Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Black. 39
In the dissenting opinion it was pointed out that one of the major
purposes for the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 was
to narrow the good faith defense, since it, as it existed in the Clayton
34. Id. at 214-17.
35. 340 U.S. at 251.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

241.
250.
249 n.15.
251-67.
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Act of 1914, had proven to be such a loophole frustrating the enforcement of that law. In that connection, it was stated "What follows in
this dissent demonstrates, we think, that Congress intended so to
amend the Clayton Act that the avenue of escape given price discriminators by its 'meeting competition' clause should be narrowed.
The Court's interpretation leaves what the seller can do almost as
wide open as before. '40 The dissenting opinion directed attention to
the fact that the public policy spelled out in the statute again would
be frustrated as a result of the Court's holding in the Standard case.41
In accordance with the Court's decision, the case was returned to
the Commission and the latter proceeded with the reconsideration of
the evidence of record. Following such reconsideration, and on the
basis of the record, the Commission made findings of facts relating
to Standard's contention that although it had discriminated in price,
it had done so through meeting in "good faith" the equally low price
of a competitor. The Commission concluded that Standard had failed
to sustain its burden of proving that its lower price was accorded in
"good faith" to meet the equally low price of a competitor. Consequently, Standard again petitioned the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit to review and set aside the Commission's findings and
order. 42 On review, the circuit court set aside the Commission's order.
It held that Standard's "good faith" defense "was firmly established,
and the Commission's reasoning by which it reached a contrary conclusion is untenable and must be rejected." 43
The Commission's petition to the Supreme Court for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 44 has been
granted. The Court, on January 27, 1958, by a vote of five to four, held
that Standard had acted in "good faith. '44a The Court so held even
though Standard's "good faith" resulted in substantially lessening
competition through its action of discriminating in price.
The question of law decided by the Court on the earlier occasion was
not before the Court in the recent proceeding. The Commission, in its
40. Id. at 253.

41. Id. at 263. With reference to the practice of price discrimination, Mr.
Justice Reed stated: "The control of that evil was an important objective of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The debates, the Commission's report and recommendation, and statutory changes show this. The Conference Report and the
explanation by one of the managers, Mr. Utterback, are quite definitive upon
the point. Because of experience under the Clayton Act, Congress refused
to continue its competitive price proviso. Yet adoption of petitioner's position would permit a seller of nationally distributed goods to discriminate in
favor of large chain retailers, for the seller could give to the large retailer
a price lower than that charged to small retailers, and could then completely
justify its discrimination by showing that the large retailer had first obtained
the same low price from a local low-cost producer of competitive goods."
42. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956).
43. Id. at 655.
44. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., petition for cert. filed, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3148
(U.S. Sept. 28, 1956) (No. 465), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 950 (1956).
44a. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 78 Sup. Ct. 369 (1958).
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petition for its writ of certiorari in the recent proceeding made
reference to the Court's earlier decision in the Standard Oil case, 45
and acknowledged that "It is now settled under section 2 (b) that an
otherwise illegal price discrimination is not prohibited by the statute
if shown to have been made in good faith to meet an equally low
46
price of a competitor."
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the opinion and decision
of the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case has in effect, as observed by Justice Reed in his dissenting opinion, gone contrary to
the intent of Congress and opened up a large loophole in the Clayton
Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act to such an extent that
although Congress had acted in 1936 to narrow the application of the
"good faith" defense proviso, "the Court's interpretation leaves what
4
the seller can do almost as wide open as before." 7
This situation gave rise to the need for the Congress to amend the
law along the lines provided for in H. R. 11 and S. 11. Unless that is
done, the law will become almost a nullity.
The action by the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case has
proven to be a signal to law enforcement agencies and to lower courts
to ease up on the effective enforcement of that part of the public
policy governed by the Clayton Antitrust Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act. A later section of this article will refer to
and document the manner in which the enforcement agencies and
courts have reacted to the Supreme Court's signal and to the damage
inflicted upon our antitrust public policy.
ADDITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS HAVE HELPED PULL THE TEETH
FROM THE LAW

The decisions of the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case made
a hole in the Robinson-Patman Act. However, price discriminators
used and expanded that loophole to escape the application of the law
against price discrimination. The expansion of the escape hatch was
made by court decisions and actions of the Federal Trade Commission
in other cases. While some of those decisions are not based squarely
and solidly upon the "good faith" defense of section 2 (b), they nevertheless go hand in hand with the Supreme Court's decision in the
Standard Oil case in making greater difficulties for the enforcement

of our laws against destructive price discriminations. Indeed, they
are, in the terminology of the tort case lawyer, the natural and
foreseeable consequences of the decision in the Standard Oil case.
45. 340 U.S. 231 (1950).

46. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., petition for writ of certiorari p. 8, 25 U.S.L.
WEEK 3148 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1956) (No. 465).
47. 340 U.S. at 253.
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The effort made by the Government in the Standard Oil case for
a clarifying interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act to facilitate
its enforcement against destructive price discriminations marked the
point of greatest advance in the enforcement effort. That effort having
failed, the enforcement agencies adopted an attitude of indifference
toward the Robinson-Patman Act. Not only the Federal Trade Commission, but the courts joined in the retreat from the enforcement of
our laws against monopolistic price discriminations. Thus, the result
of the Standard Oil case transcended the immediate area of the cases
involving good faith defenses, although in a number of the additional
cases the good faith defense was included among others.
In the case of Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.,48 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit not only broadened the "good faith"
defense but also added to enforcement difficulties by increasing the
plaintiff's burden of proving injury to competition.
The Balian case was a consolidation of actions brought by fifteen
small producers and distributors of ice cream operating in the Los
Angeles, California, area against the large competing Arden Farms
Company. Arden not only did business in the sale of ice cream in
Los Angeles, but in other sections of California and in other states,
including Oregon, Washington, Montana, Arizona, and Idaho.
Arden is one of the largest firms handling dairy products in the
West. It owns and operates an ice cream plant in Los Angeles which
is one of the largest in the United States. During 1950, one of the
years involved in the Balian case, Arden sold and distributed 4,200,000
gallons of ice cream in the Los Angeles area, a total of seventeen per
cent of all the ice cream sold in that area. During the same year
the aggregate sales of fifteen other ice cream companies, who were the
vigorous competitors of Arden in Los Angeles, accounted for only
thirteen per cent of the total volume of ice cream sold there.
These small producers and distributors of ice cream doing a local
business in the Los Angeles area provided the only vigorous competition that concerned Arden. Actually, they sold at lower prices than
Arden in the Los Angeles area. Yet, it was not shown that their
lower prices were unlawful or discriminatory. However, their lower
prices were regarded as "chiselling cuts." Therefore, Arden, while
holding the level of its prices in other areas at higher levels, cut its
price on certain of its ice cream items to some of its customers in certain sections of the Los Angeles area. It did that only where it was
faced with the most vigorous competition from the smaller ice cream
companies who were selling at lower prices.
The discrimination in price resorted to by Arden resulted in injury
to its smaller competitors in the Los Angeles area. They sued Arden
48. 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
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for violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. The trial court ruled for
Arden.49 That decision for Arden was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as above noted. In affirming the case
for Arden, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' contention that
Arden was wrongfully destroying competition and stated "the court
,however found that Arden had actually acted in good faith to meet
the low price of some of its competitors."5 0
The court of appeals in the Balian case ignored the economic significance of price discrimination and the true intent and purpose of
Congress in passing the laws against price discrimination. Also, it
demonstrated a lack of sympathy for those provisions of our antitrust
laws which prohibit price discriminations. The Court concluded:
The implication of the arguments of plaintiffs is that prices can never
be lowered by a concern, which does any interstate business, in one
area if it fails to make a corresponding cut in every locality where it
does business.
Any revenue loss to plaintiffs as a result of the lowering of prices is
merely one of the results of local competition.
It is true that Arden in certain respects engages in interstate commerce,
but it does not follow that the price differentials in different areas have
any relation to each other, even if sales involving interstate commerce
were given consideration.
The "blanket price cut," so called in this area, was unquestionably
necessary in the opinion of Arden to eliminate a great many of the
chiselling cuts, special advantages and rebates given by its competitors
in this very area.
It is obvious that Arden, by selling ice cream products in the Los
Angeles area at a lower price than it charged for like products in other
states, did not violate § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended, [by the
Robinson-Patman Act] 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (a).51

The Court in the Balian case also found that there was no price
discrimination, and hence no competitive injury since all competing
customers were charged the same price. It did not consider the sales
to customers in other states as being in competition with those in
Los Angeles and thereby disregarded the fact that Arden was in
competition with smaller sellers not only in the Los Angeles area
but also in other areas. Accordingly, since the court failed to see
that there were any price discriminations involved, it indicated that
49. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Calif.

1952).
50. 231 F.2d at 366. Compare Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S.
115 (1954).
51. 231 F.2d at 366-67.
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Arden could have reduced its price "below" that of its competitors, so
long as all of its customers in the Los Angeles area competing with
each other, receive the same lower price there. Also the Court indicated that it did not matter whether the lower prices of Arden's
smaller competitors which were being met were "lawful" or "unlawful." Thus, the Balian case decision expanded the loophole in the
Robinson-Patman Act previously made by the decision in the Stand52
ard Oil case.
Even the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, who appeared
before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, and
testified in opposition to H. R. 11, admitted that the opinion and decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in the Balian case
"was a somewhat perplexing decision." 53
In the case of Enterprises Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co.,M the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed the trend established by
the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case and followed by the
Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit in the Balian case. It refused
to apply the Robinson-Patman Act to curb price discriminations
practiced by The Texas Company.
The Texas Company had temporarily granted price reductions in
one area to gasoline dealers operating in the neighborhood of the
city of Hartford, Connecticut. The plaintiff, Enterprises Industries,
operated a filling station in the town of Wethersfield, Connecticut, a
short distance south of the boundary of Hartford. The Texas Company refused to make any price reduction to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the price discriminations practiced by The Texas
Company in that instance injured competition. The court disagreed
and stated: "In view of what we have said it is not necessary to
consider whether the defendant proved its defense under the proviso
of § 13 (b) ."55
One of the most criticized decisions by the Federal Trade Commission was made in a case arising under the Robinson-Patman Act. It
was handed down subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in the
Standard Oil case. The case involved a complaint against General
Foods Corp.56 The Commission dismissed that case on the ground that

Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956).
53. Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (on H.R. 11, and other bills to
52. Compare Standard Oil

amend §§ 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act).
54. 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957).
55. Id. at 460.

56. General Foods Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 25069 at 35215-16 (1954).
Compare FTC Document No. 6008, In the matter of Purex Corp., decided
September 27, 1954. This decision of the FTC emphasized the fact that the
FTC did, as in its decision of the General Foods case, require proof of a
greater degree of injury than had been required to sustain complaints against
price discrimination. Indeed, the degree of proof that the Commission indicated in its General Foods decision that it would require in price discrimina-
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Government counsel had not presented a sufficient amount of proof
relating to the lessening of competition.
Hon. James M. Mead, a member of the Federal Trade Commission,
dissented from the views of the majority regarding the dismissal of
the General Foods case. In his dissent, he stated:
The record in this case shows that General Foods increased its share of
the market and that the competitors of General Foods had a decreasing
share of the market. .

.

. in 1939, the year immediately prior to the

initiation of the deals, General Foods controlled 62.2% of the national
market in pectin.... General Foods' share of the market increased during the "deal" years to 1946 when its share was 80.5% of the market.
Economists may differ as to what particular percentage of the national market a concern may have before it may be classified as a
monopoly. A concern having 35 percent of the market may not be a
monopoly, but certainly when a concern begins to obtain over 50 percent of the national market in any particular commodity, then such
concern, because of such a share, is in the position to exert a very significant effect on the market. An area price discrimination by a concern having 35 percent of the market may not have as great an adverse
effect as a discrimination by a concern controlling 80 percent of the
market....
It is admitted that Government counsel did not offer in evidence in
this case the scalps or the hides of the small-business competitors of
General Foods. We do not have in evidence pounds of flesh or buckets
of blood. We should not expect the type of evidence that Salome is said to
57
have asked of Herod-the head of John the Baptist on a silver platter.
tion cases was hailed as a revolutionary change in FTC policy in the enforcement of antitrust laws. Shortly after that decision was announced, Business
Week Magazine carried a lead article entitled The Republicans Reshape the
FTC. That article, which appeared in the issue of June 5, 1954, made reference to the Commission's dismissal and closing out of the General Foods case
and with reference to the change in the FTC policy stated: "Basically, of
course, FTC remains an enforcement agency: . . . FTC's job has in no way

changed, but the way it intends to carry it out has changed. As compared
to the way the Democrats did things, the Republicans are making it easier
for the businessman who is up on the FTC carpet, harder for the FTC lawyers
handling the cases.... Some observers say that, as a practical matter, FTC is
setting standards of proof that will make the lawyers' job almost impossible.
.. . Finally FTC has just adopted a complete reorganization program. The
immediate significance of the reorganization, however, is that it gives (Chairman) Howrey the chance to name his own team. When the plan becomes
effective July 1, the Republican majority will really have come into its own."
See The Organizationand Procedures of the Federal Regulatory Commissions
and Agencies and Their Effect on Small Business, H.R. REP. No. 2967, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1956).
Subsequent to these decisions and after a barage of criticism was leveled at
the FTC and other enforcement agencies because of their failure to enforce
the laws against destructive price discriminations, the Chairman of the FTC
resigned and the Commission appeared to adopt a policy reversing the trend
indicated by the decisions in the GeneralFoods and Purex cases. For example,
shortly thereafter a majority of the members of the FTC announced a position in support of H.R. 11. Also a majority of the Commission has recently
been quite active in initiating and in concluding a number of significant cases
against destructive price discriminations. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., Cease and
Desist Order, CCH TiMDE REG. REP. (1957 Trade Cas.) ff 26257 at 36061 (FTC,
Sept. 10, 1957).
57. See Price Discrimination,The Robinson-Patman Act, and The Attorney
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This whittling away of our laws against monopolistic price discriminations resulted in numerous protests from small businessmen

throughout the nation. Their representatives testified before numerous
Committees of the Congress and pled for the passage of H. R. 11 and
S. 11.58

The Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives of the United States conducted extensive hearings regarding
the manner in which the practice of monopolistic price discrimination
was being promoted instead of being curbed. In that connection, it
reported a showing of how the Robinson-Patman Act had been interpreted away by the Federal Trade Commission and the Courts, with
particular reference to interpretations relating to subsection (b) of
section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act.5 9

WHAT PROMPTED TH DAMAGING DECISIONS?
Business conditions experienced during the great depression in the
early part of the 1930's emphasized need for greater antimonopoly
effort if our country was to avoid the cartelization policy to which
the countries of Europe had fallen victim. This problem was later
described by the Temporary National Economic Committee in the
following language:
Private enterprise is ceasing to be free enterprise and is becoming a
cluster of private collectivisms; masking itself as a system of free enterprise after the American model, it is in fact becoming a concealed cartel
system after the European model.6 0
Studies and recommendations made in the 1930's for new legislation
and for greater effort toward enforcement of existing laws against
monopolistic conditions started a trend toward a stronger antimonopoly policy.
The policy for expenditure of greater and more effective effort in
General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws. H.R. REP. No.
2966, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1956).
58. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1956)

(on H.R. 11

and other proposals to amend the Clayton Act); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 959 (1957) (on S. 11 and other proposals to
amend § 2 of the Clayton Act).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 2966, op. cit. supra note 57, at 285. See also Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1026-92 (1957)

(on S. 11 and other

proposals to amend § 2 of the Clayton Act), for a listing of speeches and reports to the House of Representatives regarding the need for the strengthening

of the law against price discrimination.
60. See Temporary National Economic Committee, Final Report, S. Doc.
No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1941).
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the enforcement of our antimonopoly laws found expression under
the leadership of Hon. Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General,
then head of the Antitrust Division in the United States Department
of Justice, and a newly appointed Federal Trade Commission under
the leadership of Hon. Ewin L. Davis, its new Chairman. Assistant
Attorney General Arnold earned the title "Trust Buster." The Federal Trade Commission with new vigor also attracted much attention
by reason of its stepped up activities in prosecuting antimonopoly
cases.
In the period 1938-1943 the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice, under the leadership of Thurman Arnold, increased its activities six fold over comparable preceeding periods, measured by the
number of antitrust cases instituted. 61 Of greater importance was the
significance of the individual cases. Perhaps reference to a few of
those cases will indicate the significance of the antimonopoly cases
instituted by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
during that period of time. Price fixing of long standing in important
62
industries, based on license agreements under patents, were enjoined.
Section 3 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, prohibiting exclusive dealing
agreements and tie-in sales was given new meaning, facilitating its
enforcement. 63 Other cases were directed to break up cartel arrangements between American firms and foreign corporations when they
were found to be in restraint of trade in this country and to be interfering with the foreign trade of other American concerns.64 Additional
cases were brought to break up arrangements restraining trade in the
field of communications. 65 Still other cases were directed to dissolution
of monopoly combinations.66 Greater advances were made in clarifying
67
and strengthening the law against price fixing agreements as such.
The monopoly work of the Department of Justice did not stand
alone. Before the middle 1930's the Federal Trade Commission had
moved with investigations of the price fixing basing point system in
the cement and steel industries. In 1937 it instituted formal proceedings against almost 100 cement manufacturing corporations and their
trade association, the Cement Institute.68 Simultaneously, the Federal
61. See H.R. Doc. No. 240, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 657-60 (1957).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 368 (1945); United States v. Univis Lens Co.,
316 U.S. 241 (1942); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1940).
63. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); United States
v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aifd per curiam, 343

U.S. 922 (1952).

64. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945).
65. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Pullman Co., 330 U.S. 806 (1946).
67. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
68. Cement Institute, 1946-47 Trade Cas. ff 57490 (1946). Complaint issued
July 2, 1937. The cement industry spent almost $5 million opposing that
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Trade Commission moved against price discrimination practices and
was remarkably successful in the prosecution of its cases.6 9 A number of other cases were instituted during the 1940's by the Federal
Trade Commission against the practice of price discrimination in which
Cease and Desist Orders were entered by the Federal Trade Commission but the approval by the Courts came much later in proceedings brought for the enforcement of those orders.70
Small business concerns and others injured as a result of violations
of antitrust laws filed suits for damages in ever increasing numbers. 71
Congress provided in our antitrust laws for these private civil cases.
That was done as a measure for deterring further violations of our
antitrust laws.
In one private civil antitrust case brought by reason of the price of
price discrimination (plaintiff did not prevail because of technical
pleading faults) Justice Jackson, in an opinion for the Court, stated
that,
If [the buyer] can show [that the prices charged were discriminatory] ...
it would establish its right to recover three times the discriminatory difference without proving more than the illegality of the prices. If the
prices are illegally discriminatory, petitioner has been damaged, in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances, at least in the amount of that
discrimination. 2

Hardly had that policy for stronger and more effective enforcement
of our antimonopoly laws been undertaken and certainly before it
had gained much momentum, when representatives of parties who
were being accused of violating our antitrust laws began to fight not
only the cases but also the stronger policy. They argued for more "reason" and less strictness in the application of our antimonopoly policy.
They organized "public relations programs" which were designed as a
basis for lobbying against the application of our antitrust policy. One
such program was specifically designed and planned to reach and convince 153,853 Government officials, legislators, newspaper writers,
business and professional leaders. It was to be loaded with arguments
that certain practices, including the practice of price discrimination,
action by the FTC but the FTC was sustained by the Supreme Court of the

United States. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
69. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Corn Products Refining
Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746
(1945); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946); Samuel H.
Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945).
70. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); FTC v. Standard Brands, 189
F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1951). See also National Biscuit Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff
3508.120 (1944).
71. See The Monopoly Problem, H.R. Doc. No. 240, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
662 (1957).
72. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947).

See also Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945).
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were "competitive practices and should not be regarded as falling
within the purview of our antitrust laws."7 3
Another plan or program provided for a much broader base for
"re-educating" not only the leaders but the American public regarding
what should be considered as "competitive" and what should be considered as "monopolistic" practices. That plan was designed to provide
arguments for use by not only newspaper writers but also for use by
debaters in high schools and colleges.7 4 That plan has been described
as a "blueprint for lobbying against our antitrust laws." It was designed by representatives of a number of parties who had been charged
with violations of our antitrust laws.
The arguments set forth in articles, books and speeches having
their roots in ideas contained in these "public relations programs" and
"the blueprint for lobbying against our antitrust laws" presented a
common pattern. They sought to convince the readers, including the
reading public, Government officials, legislators and courts that price
discriminations and other practices previously found to be monopolistic were in fact "competitive" and that laws directed specifically
against those practices were laws inconsistent with an antimonopoly
policy for free and unfettered competition.
These plans and programs, along with the writings which followed,
gave rise to a new body of literature regarding the laws against
price discrimination. The arguments in the writings described antitrust laws prohibiting price discriminations as being inconsistent, if
not in conflict, with our basic antitrust law, namely, the Sherman Act
of 1890.
The arguments directed against our laws prohibiting monopolistic
price discriminations frequently were extended to include an attack
on the agencies charged with the enforcement of these laws. Those
agencies include the Federal Trade Commission.
An informative record on how that attack was carried on against
the Federal Trade Commission and the laws it administers appears in
Earl Latham of Amherst Cola report which was made by 7Professor
5
lege, Amherst, Massachusetts.
Soon, articles and speeches were appearing in respectable forums
73. See Price Discrimination,The Robinson-PatmanAct, and The Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, H.R. REP. No.
2966, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1956).
74. Id. at 27-28.
75. See the report entitled Latham, The Politics of Basing Point Legislation,
15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 272 (1950). This report was reprinted in the record
of the Hearings on Price Discrimination,before the House Select Committee
on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 541-79 (1955). See also Simon, The
Case Against the FederalTrade Commission, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 297 (1951) and
the answers to that attack on the FTC, Wallace and Douglas, Antitrust P'olicies and the New Attack on the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. CM. L. REv.
684 (1952). Additional materials relating to that matter may be found in
Price Discrimination,H.R. RE'. No. 2966, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 36 (1956).
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and printed in highly respected publications. It was well known that
those publications would reach the eye, ear and mind of the Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States and the judges of other
federal courts having jurisdiction over cases arising under our antitrust laws. These articles and speeches took up the refrain that our
antitrust policy was too rigid and strict. A number of them continued
the argument that the practice of price discrimination was a "competitive" practice and that the Clayton Antitrust Act as amended by
the Robinson-Patman Act to prohibit price discriminations was inconsistent with our national antitrust policy.76
Many of the articles and speeches attacking the Robinson-Patman
Act were prepared by persons who have represented or who have
been employed otherwise by parties charged with violations of our
antitrust laws.
Some of those articles referred to containing arguments against the
laws prohibiting the practice of price discrimination were noted and
considered by the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
in making their decisions. There is no doubt about the fact that members of the courts actually relied upon arguments in those articles in
making their decisions against the application of our laws which were
designed to prohibit monopolistic price discriminations. It is clear
that the arguments in those articles were a factor in leading the Court
to the decision it made in the Standard Oil case. 77
Once it was noted and realized by those charged with violating our
antitrust laws that the Supreme Court and other courts were beginning to read, consider and rely upon the arguments appearing in law
review articles and other such works regarding what should be done
about applying our laws against the practice of price discrimination,
76. For articles relating to that matter, see Adelman, Effective Competition
and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. Rnv. 1289 (1948); Burns, If You Are In
Business You Are Probably Guilty, 28 BARRow's WEEKLY 5 (1948); Clark,
Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 241 (1940);
Hilder, The Attack Upon Delivered Price Systems, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 397
(1946); Kittelle & Lamb, The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine and Delivered
Pricing, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 227 (1950); Mason, Current Status of the

Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. Ruv. 1265 (1949); Mason,
Lets Stop Kicking Business Around, American Magazine, May 1948; McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
273 (1937); Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REv. 1139-1244 (1952); Simon, Price Discrimination to Meet Competition, U. ILL. L. FoRum 575, 581-83 (1950); Smith,
Effective Competition: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws, 26
N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 405 (1951).
77. 340 U.S. at 249. See also a speech made in the House of Representatives
of the United States regarding this subject entitled "The Effect of Lobbyists'
Propaganda On Our Supreme Court," 103 CoNG. REc. 14758-67 (daily ed.
Aug. 27, 1957). See also how reliance upon those articles by the Supreme
Court of the United States was carried over and borrowed by the judges of
other federal courts for their use as a basis for their decisions in cases against
the application of laws prohibiting price discrimination. Standard Oil Co. v.
Brown, 238 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir. 1956).
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the number of such articles multiplied.
Suggestions were made for the formation of a committee which
would write a "compendium of articles" in the form of a report which
would contain recommendations to the enforcement officials and to
the courts for a "revision of antitrust policy. ' 78 In that connection, it
was suggested that such a "Committee on Revision of National Antitrust Policy" should be organized and financed as a private body.70
Such a committee was formed. The Attorney General of the United
States was persuaded to appoint the members of that committee.
Therefore, it became known as "The Attorney General's Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws." Although that Committee was organized
as a private body, with its members serving without compensation,
the Attorney General drew upon the appropriations which were voted
by Congress to the Department of Justice for the enforcement of the
antitrust laws for use in defraying the traveling expenses of the members of the Committee.
One of the disappointing aspects about the selection of sixty-one
members of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study The
Antitrust Laws, is the fact that a large majority selected were from
among the ranks of those who had been representing violators of our
antitrust laws. Approximately two-thirds of all the practicing lawyers who were included in the membership of the Attorney General's
Committee had appeared directly or through their law firms as
advocates for persons charged with violations of the antitrust laws.
A large number of them were attorneys of record in opposition to the
Government in pending antimonopoly cases.
A number of the members of the Attorney General's Committee had
authored articles which appeared in law reviews and other publications in opposition to the Government's strong antimonopoly enforcement program.
Attorney General Brownell made perfectly clear the objective of
his Committee when he stated:
for responsible points of
Our aim was to gather articulate spokesmen
8
view to formulate future antitrust policy. 0
The Report of the Attorney General's Committee was published
March 31, 1955.81 It is an odd tool for use in making more effective our
antimonopoly policy.
78. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts To a Revised

Antitrust Policy, 50 Mcu. L. REv. 1139 (1952).
79. Id. at 1143.

80. Hearings on Price Discrimination Before the House Select Committee
on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 813 (1955).
81. THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1955).
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The Report recommended to the courts and to the enforcement

agencies that they approve the standards accepted by the Federal
Trade Commission in the General Foods case and the rule laid down
by the Supreme Court in its decision in the Standard Oil case. 82
The Report 83 recommended to the courts and the enforcement agencies that they stop short and not apply section 3 of the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act to situations which had been
approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
StandardOil Co. v. United States,84 commonly known as the Standard
Stations case. Also it recommended to the courts and the enforcement
agencies, 85 that the Federal Trade Commission Act, section 5 should
not be interpreted and applied to prohibit pricing practices which
substantially lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly as
unfair methods of competition or as an unfair act or practice in
commerce unless there was found also present the ingredient of "collusion" which would make the offense violative also of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.
The Report treated kindly license agreements restricting price competition in the sale of products covered by patents. It endorsed interpretations of antitrust laws favoring leniency of the application of
antitrust laws to such license agreements, even when involving and
requiring competing sellers to adhere to prices fixed by agreement.8 6
Thus, the recommendations in the Report provided for a retreat from
the application of the antitrust law as had been approved by landmark
decisions, such as United States v. Line Material Co.,87 and United
States v. United States Gypsum Co.88 The Report thus argued for a
diluted and relaxed antimonopoly policy.89 Following those recommendations would be tantamount to approving price fixing agreements
condemned in the Gypsum case and the Line Material case.
Key recommendations made in the Report to the courts and to the
enforcement agencies were those dealing with so-called "workable"
or "effective" competition. The recommendations called for the inclusion of this new economic concept of "workable" or "effective"
competition in the consideration of antimonopoly cases. The keystone
upon which that economic concept is founded was the argument for
a "rule of reason." It was proposed as a starting point for evaluating
challenged business practices, methods and conditions. It was proposed
82. Id. at 163, 181.
83. Id. at 146-49.

84. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
85. THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 216-19 (1955).

86. Id. at 231.
87. 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
88. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).

GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMIITTEE TO STUDY

89. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 233-35 (1955).
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that this be done before determining whether any business practice is
violative of our antimonopoly laws.9°
Thus, the principal purpose of the committee was to provide a
restatement of law, interpreting antitrust policy according to an
economic "rule of reason," pointing toward "effective competition."
The connotations were quite plain. None could deny the value of
"reason," or reject competition as a goal-and the more "effective" the
competition, the better.
As observed previously, the roots of the concept of "effective competition" go back to J. M. Clark's article "Toward a Concept of Workable Competition." 91 The idea had a contagious appeal and it was
quickly adopted by other writers. It soon went through a metamorphosis and emerged as "effective competition." This latter term was
perhaps the result of a psychological block in the mind of someone
who felt that it is not enough for competition to be merely workable,
it must also be effective. However, the advocates of neither branch
have concisely spelled out the conditions of either effectiveness or
workability; and if there was ever any real conceptual difference, it
has been forgotten. Since the appearance of the monopolists' handbook, put out under the name of "Effective Competition," by the
Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce on December 18, 1952, the latter term has been more generally adopted,
perhaps as a matter of euphony. It appears to have been the purpose
of the Attorney General's Committee to consider and use the two
terms synonymously.
With equal aplomb, and considerably more inaccuracy, the Committee was also to treat "pure" and "perfect" competition as synonymous in arriving at its policy recommendations.
The purpose of the Attorney General's Committee for treating as
synonymous the terms "pure" and "perfect" competition becomes
clearer when the chapter of that Committee's Report dealing with
economic indicia is studied. It is around that chapter that the entire
Report is written. The purpose of that chapter is to analyze what it
called the "main course of antitrust policy" and to give an evaluation
of "antitrust development ...in light of established antitrust goals."
The organizational idea for such "evaluation" and the intent behind
the so-called "established" antitrust goals was to merge an argument
from the lawyer's realm on one hand and certain ideas which had
been expressed by several economists on the other. From the lawyer's
realm the idea borrowed encompassed "the rule of reason" standards
approved in the old Standard Oil case of 1911.92 From the economists
90. Id. at 5-12, 318-42.
91. 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 241 (1940).
92. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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was borrowed the idea of "effective competition" which had begun to

9
appear in the writings of a few economists in very recent times. 3
However, the Report claimed:

Economists have in recent years given increasing attention to the study
of detailed factual situations, and have developed a more complex and
multiform theory of "workable" or "effective" competition to take account
the identification of
of a much wider range of market factors, bearing 9on
4
competition and monopoly in the economic sense.

Continuing in the same vein, the Report contains no scarcity of such
references to a theory of "workable" or "effective" competition; and
at one place this theory is alluded to as having the classic attributes
of a theory, so much so that it can serve the classic function of a
theory, namely, as a tool for analysis. As such, it is presented not
merely as a tool for use by economists, but by the courts, "which
permits the systematic study of a great variety of market facts."
[T]he theory is here offered as one which, from an economic standpoint,
permits the systematic study of a great variety of market facts... . [I]t
provides the courts with tools of analysis in making the factual inquiry
into problems of competition and monopoly .... 95

Some of the members of the group who concurred on the indicia
chapter nevertheless objected to the use of the term "theory" in connection with the literature on "workable" or "effective" competition,

but conceded, presumably out of politeness, the term "doctrine."
Thus at the conclusion of the general discussion of the "theory" the

Report adds:
A few members stress that the "doctrine" of workable competition is
only a rough and ready judgment by some economists, each for himself,
that a particular industry is performing reasonably well-presumably
relative to alternative industrial arrangements which are practically
attainable. There are no objective criteria of workable competition, and
such criteria as are proffered are at best intuitively reasonable modifica96
tions of the rigorous and abstract criteria of perfect competition.
Similarly the Report carries a cautionary note from the father of
"workable" competition, Professor J. M. Clark, himself a member of
the indicia group,
93. Prof. J. M. Clark is generally credited with having started the literature on "workable" or "effective" competition in a paper titled Toward A
Concept of Workable Competition, read at a joint round table of the American
Economic Association and the Econometric Society in 1939, and later published
in 30 AM. EcoN. REV. 241 (1940).
94. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAws 316 (1955).
95. Ibid.
96. Id. at 339.
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. The attempt to select economic concepts which are usefully relevant to
antitrust problems results in a presentation which is selective, not only
as to concepts included, but as to views held by economists on these concepts: ... 97

While referring repeatedly to the economists' "theory" of "effective"
or "workable competition" nowhere does the Report indicate where a
statement of this alleged "theory" is to be found. Yet the Report cautions that the chapter dealing with this "theory,"
is not a complete balanced review of the economic theory, for it is concerned only with some selected concepts which are useful in the analysis
in situations frequently encountered.
The Report does, however, offer discussions on the characteristics of
"effective" competition, not without many qualifications and contradictions; and it offers several abortive definitions of "effective" competition. Least unequivocal of these definitions is the following:
The essence of full monopoly power resides in being the sole source of
a product, so that the buyer must meet the seller's terms or go without.
The essence of competition is to free the buyer from this power by access
to alternative sources of the product. 98
Thus it was made clear at the outset that the theory placed its emphasis on access of all buyers to alternative sellers; or conversely, access of all sellers to each individual buyer. This is the first indication
of the concept, fully employed at another stage of the Report, which
makes each buyer a separate and distinct "market," where sellers'
prices are to be equated.
In one of the alternative definitions it is said that a basic characteristic of "effective" competition is that "no one seller and no group of
sellers acting in concert have the power to choose their level of
profits." At a later point however, profits are discussed as one of the
indicia of "effective competition," or one of the tests of performance,
and are dismissed as having no particular relationship to either
"effective competition" or "effective monopoly."
A proper definition of "the market" is held out to be of crucial
importance to "effective competition," but the imprecise one which
is offered proposes that:
[T]he market is the sphere of competitive rivalry within which the crucial
transfer of patronage from one supplier of goods or services to another
can take place freely.99
97. Id. at 317.
98. Id. at 318.

99. Id. at 322.
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Here the discussion places considerable emphasis on "substitute
products" but then, again, this emphasis is counterbalanced with a
warning that public policy cannot "afford to be indifferent to the
elimination of competition to the industry."
There follows, then, a discussion of ten topics, or indicia, "bearing
on identification of workable competition." Thus, the first of the indicia has to do with the number of "effective competitive" sellers and
the relative strength of firms. Here it is said that the number and
relative size of firms required "cannot be compressed into a formula,"
but light is thrown on the matter by describing it as an absence of
''effective monopoly."
For effective competition, in the economic sense, to exist, there should
be that degree of self-interested independent rivalry in any given market
that exists where there is no one firm or group of firms acting in concert
which have effective monopoly power, as heretofore defined. 00
And so are the other nine indicia discussed, each with similar
indefiniteness, and each carrying finely counterbalanced statements
concerning their significance, as a factor bearing on workable competition. Yet, somehow, these ten indicia, taken together, are supposed to
provide a "tool for analysis" by which the courts are to determine
whether or not competition is satisfactorily "workable."
Finally, again, there is a definition of "effective" or "workable competition":
The economic definition of workable competition concentrates on the
effective limits it sets on the power of a seller, or group of sellers acting
in concert, over their price. 101
In elaboration of a theory which concentrates on price, the indicia
have strange and incomplete things to say about "price." In the first
place, the discussion proclaims that "no particular definition of price
is required"; and then in the same sentence it proceeds to supply a
very particular definition, as follows
"price" is simply what the buyer has paid the seller as consideration for
the goods and related services he has sought and purchased.102
One unfortunate circumstance of this definition is that the prohibitions
of the Robinson-Patman Act go to discriminations in the seller's price.
More specifically, section 2 (a) of the Act forbids the seller to discriminate in his prices under the circumstances and with the qualifications
set out; and section 2 (f) forbids the buyer to coerce or knowingly
100. Id. at 325.
101. Id. at 324.
102. Id. at 334.
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accept an illegal discrimination in the seller's price.
A second unfortunate result of a definition which limits the examination of prices to a question of whether a particular buyer pays identical
prices to all sellers who care to sell, or quote, that buyer, is that it
eliminates a useful tool for analysis by which the courts have, in the
past, been able to make deductions about the existence of price-fixing
conspiracies among sellers. This tool, in short, has been the traditional
competitive theory, by which the sellers' price behavior is examined.
Why, then, is a new "tool for analysis" needed to replace the old?
The answer seems to be, not that the traditional theory contains
errors, or that it fails to provide an unchanging standard by which
departures from competitive performance may be compared and the
causes analyzed, but, rather, that there is a danger in this theory for
the reason that it may be used not merely as a tool for analysis, but,
indeed, that it may be mistaken as a literal goal of public policy. The
Report of the Attorney General's Committee states:
Under pure competition (and a fortiori under the perfect competition) no
price discrimination could exist. Every seller would sell at the going price
and would have no power to charge more and no need to take less. But
any attempt to infer from this that price discrimination, in the economic
sense, is "inherently monopolistic" or presumptively anti-competitive, is
implicit acceptance of pure or perfect competition as a workable goal of
public policy. We have already shown that the terms "pure" and "perfect"
mean merely precise or complete in the theoretical sense, not ideal or
desirable. We therefore repudiate pure and perfect competition as direct
goals of antitrust policy.10 3
An effective answer has been made to that argument by an eminent
economist who testified in hearings before the Select Committee on
Small Business of the House of Representatives on this subject. Professor Holbrook Working of Stanford University, on that point, testified
as follows:
Consider why the theory of perfect competition was constructed. Its
purpose was to analyze the effects of competition under conditions which
are somewhat artificially simplified for purposes of analysis but which
were supposed to fairly well approximate actual or attainable conditions
in a considerable part of the economy. The results of this analysis were
to show that competition of the sort considered had desirable results.
Among those results that were considered desirable are some that depend
directly on absence of price discrimination. The belief that price discrimination tends to be objectionable runs as a thread through all the
history of economic thought on the effects of competition. Any implication
that economists have held only that price discrimination was objectionable
under the peculiar and special conditions of perfect competition, and under
those considerations only, is untrue. 104
103. Ibid.
104. Price Discrimination, The Robinson-Patman Act, and The Attorney
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Much additional testimony was received in congressional hearings
from expert economists, serving as leaders in our fine educational
institutions all over the country, regarding this matter. 1 5 In their
testimony they fully supported the view expressed by Professor
Working. One thing to remember about the testimony of these expert
economists, who testified on this subject before the congressional committees, is that they had only the public to serve in giving their testimony. Therefore their testimony may be accepted as objective and
as an expression of unbiased thinking on this subject. They have
indeed assisted considerably in helping us to straighten out the record
about the nature of the Report of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws.
Professor Louis B. Schwartz of the Law School, University of
Pennsylvania, one of the members of the Attorney General's Committee who dissented from the position taken by the majority in the
Report stated:
The majority report would weaken the antitrust laws in a number of
respects, and, even more important, it fails to adopt necessary measures for
strengthening the law so as to create a truly competitive economy in this
country. On 30 specific issues discussed in this dissent, the report takes
a position inimical to competition, either by approving existing narrow
interpretations or by suggesting additional restrictions.lee
The Majority Report, without the full text of dissenting members
organized and attached as the dissents were written, was mailed by
the Attorney General to each of the Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States and to all Federal judges serving on courts having
jurisdiction over cases arising under our antitrust laws.
Perhaps no one will be able ever to appraise fully the effect that
the "Report of the Attorney General's National Conunittee to Study
the Antitrust Laws" has had upon our federal judges. It has all the
appearances of an official government publication, approved by the
Attorney General of the United States. Yet, in fact, it has no official
standing. The Committee was not an agency of the Government. The
Attorney General has now denied that he ever approved the Report.
During a hearing before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, in May 1955, the
possible effect the copies of the Report would have on judges in their
consideration of antitrust cases was discussed. Congressman Keating
of New York, a member of the Committee, at first was inclined to
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, H.R. REP. No. 2966,

84th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1956).
105. Id. at 190-222.
106. Id. at 132. For the complete text of Prof. Schwartz' dissent to the Report of the Attorney General's Committee, see id., app. c.
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discount the effect of any such Report on judges. Then the following
discussion took place between members of the Committee and a Mr.
McConnell, a witness. The record of that discussion is quoted as
follows:
MR. KEATING. Well, they have no probative value, do they?
MR. McCONNELL. They didn't in this instance, but they may have in
some other cases, I don't know. It depends on how much weight a court
wants to give them.
MR. KEATING. Well, no court worthy of its salt would ever give any
weight or cite in its opinion a recommendation of some committee which
had no legal force and effect whatever.
THE CHAIRMAN. I think the statement of the gentleman from New
York is absolutely sound, but I can prognosticate that many of the conclusions of this Attorney General's committee are going to be cited in
all manner and kinds of briefs in the future.
MR. McCONNELL. Why certainly.
MR. KEATING. In briefs?
MR. McCONNELL. As an authoritative statement of the antitrust
laws.

1 07

Hon. Thurman Arnold, former Assistant Attorney General and a
former judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, gave the following testimony:
I have been arguing a case on the Robinson-Patman Act in New York,
and I found the report of the Attorney General was the principal authority
used against me, ... 108

Subsequently, one of the lawyers who had been a member of the
Attorney General's Committee and therefore was apparently one of
the authors of the report of that committee cited and relied upon proposals contained therein supporting his position in a case in which
he was representing defendants charged with violations of the antitrust laws. 10 9
One of the witnesses who testified on this subject before the Select

Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives of the
United States, during 1955, referred to the Report of the Attorney
General's Committee in the following language:
This is a headline saturated document that is going to affect and color
the thinking of American courts and American lawyers and law-school
students and professors for many years to come. 110
107. Hearings on Current Antitrust Problems Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 405
(1955).
108. Hearings on Price DiscriminationBefore the House Select Committee
on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 5 (1955).
109. Chain Institute v. FTC, 246 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1957).
110. Hearings on Price DiscriminationBefore the House Select Committee
on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 871 (1955).
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The Select Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives of the United States completed its hearings and study of the
Attorney General's Committee and its report during the 84th Congress
and made a report thereon to the House of Representatives."' The
report to the House of Representatives condemned the Attorney General's Committee as not having been fairly composed to represent the
public interest and the public antimonopoly policy. Also, the report
of the Attorney General's Committee was seriously criticized as one
containing recommendations which, if followed, would seriously
2
damage our antimonopoly effort."
111. H.R. REP. No.2966, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
112. Id. at 221-28.
These pages contain the findings of the House Small Business Committee
regarding the Attorney General's Committee and its Report. Among those
findings were the following statements:
"Therefore, the Committee concludes and finds that1. The Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust
Laws was not fairly composed to represent the diverse national interests
which are injured by monopoly and protected by our antimonopoly laws and
which, accordingly, have a fundamental equity in the vigorous enforcement
of these laws and their revision as necessary to meet the fast-changing conditions of the world in which we live.
2. The 61-man committee appointed by Attorney General Brownell with
the approval of President Eisenhower was dominated by corporation lawyers
-wh had spent'a substantial part of their careers representing large corporate
defendants charged with the violation of the antimonopoly laws. Thus, of
the 46 lawyers on the committee, 39 had represented corporate defendants in
cases involving charges of antitrust violation and 26 of these had pending cases
of this character during their service on the Attorney General's committee.
Of the remaining members of the committee, one-third of the law professors who were members, had appeared as advocates for alleged violators
of antitrust laws in proceedings and investigation in the past, and almost onehalf of all the economists included in the membership of the committee had appeared as advisers or otherwise as advocates in defense of antitrust law violators.
Almost all of the other economists who were members of the committee
dissented in some respect from the position of the report. When one deducts
the law professors, who had appeared for antitrust law violators, one finds only
a small number of the remainder actually subscribed to the position taken in
the report. Two of these law professors wrote sharp dissents to the position
taken in the report by the Attorney General's committee. The Attorney General and his co-chairmen of the committee refused to have these dissents published in full as a part of the report of the committee.
There was only 1 member of the 61-man committee who could possibly
be described as a representative of American small business. There was no
representative of American labor; there was no representative of American
farmers; there was no representative of American consumers.
3. The Attorney General's committee was largely a one-sided committee,
representing almost exclusively the large business interests of the United
States, who, of course, are the principal violators of our antimonopoly laws
and who represent the principal monopoly threat in this country.
4. The Attorney General's committee also contained, among its most
active members, lawyers who had been well-known lobbyists for monopoly,
big business. Thus Mr. William Simon was a key member of the Attorney
General's committee. Mr. Simon has been probably the most energetic lobbyist in the country for the monopolistic basing-point lobby. He was a registered
lobbyist for this monopoly-minded special interest group in the period of
1949-51.
Another member of the Attorney General's committee was Mr. George
Lamb, a Washington lawyer, who in 1948 was the author of a lobby blueprint,
laying down the outline of what a basing-point lobby should consist of and
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In view of the buildup which had been given to the Report of the
how it should operate in order to restore to legality the monopolistic practice
of basing-point pricing. This blueprint was written by Mr. Lamb and his
associate, Mr. Sumner Kitelle. It was then placed in the hands of Mr. William
Simon, who at that time was the general counsel of the Capehart committee,
which was studying basing-point pricing practices in the light of the Supreme
Court's decision in the Cement case earlier in 1948 which had outlawed such
pricing practices as a principal tool of monopoly.
Mr. William Simon, in his capacity as chairman of the antitrust section of
the American Bar Association, following the publication of the report of
the Attorney General's committee in 1955, presented a resolution to the
house of delegates of the American Bar Association which would have placed
it on record as endorsing the principles enunciated in the report of the Attorney General's committee. In February of 1956 the house of delegates
adopted this resolution.

5. When the operations of the lobby provided for in the Lamb "lobby
blueprint" of 1948 are considered, along with the operations of the Attorney
General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws, they all appear
to be part and parcel of the same scheme for lobbying against our antitrust

laws.
6. The Attorney General's committee did not even attempt to study, much
less answer, the basic questions which confront the Nation in the monopoly
field, namely, Where does the United States stand today with respect to
monopoly and economic concentration? How far have we gone in that direction? How serious is the situation? What should we do about it?
Indeed, the committee, in the report it issued and caused to be published,
stated:
Our aim is not to add to the storehouse of statistical data or to survey
the economic effects of antitrust applications to specific industries * * *
[rather] to make out as clearly as possible the path that antitrust has
traveled and what it augurs for the future. (See p. 52 of this report.)
The report demonstrates that the Attorney General's committee adhered
to that aim except where it proceeded to make recommendations for future
antitrust policy. This report (pp. 60-72) contains an analysis of a number
of the recommendations made in the report of the Attorney General's committee and shows how they contrast with the recommendations which were
contained in the final report of the Temporary National Economic Committee.
The TNEC made a study of our economy problems and the concentration of
economic power in the hands of a few. It made recommendations designed to
remedy that situation. Among those recommendations were those for strengthening our antitrust laws. In contrast, the report of the Attorney General's
committee made no findings concerning the monopoly conditions in the country
and most of its recommendations were for weakening rather than strengthening our antitrust laws.
In the words of one of the members of the Attorney General's committee,
who dissented from the majority views presented in the report of that committee, Prof. Louis B. Schwartz, of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School:
The majority report would weaken the antitrust laws in a number of
respects, and, even more important, it fails to adopt necessary measures
for strengthening the law so as to create a truly competitive economy in
this country. On 30 specific issues discussed in this dissent, the report
takes a position inimical to competition, either by approving existing narrow interpretations or by suggesting additional restrictions.
Professor Schwartz and others who dissented took the position that the
.Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws had
missed a great opportunity to render a public service. In that connection it
was pointed out that there had been a failure to study the monopoly problem
and to make recommendations for the strengthening of our antimonopoly
laws. (See p. 4-5 and appendix C of this report.)
A statement on the character of the report of the Attorney General's committee was made by Senator Estes Kefauver, a member of the Judiciary Committee, United States Senate, and a widely recognized authority on problems
relating to small business and monopoly.
Senator Kefauver said:
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Attorney General's Committee and the solid basis it had acquired- in
To paraphrase General Bradley, the basic thing wrong with the majority
report is that it asks the wrong questions, at the wrong time, of the
wrong people. Among the "right" questions to which-the report should
have been directed are these: What is to be done about mfonopolistic control in those industries where it is not merely a threat to the future but
is with us here and now? What should public policy be toward those
industries where monopolistic control has already been established by the
Big Three, the Big Four, the Big Five? What should be done about the
continuing trend of concentration to even greater heights? What'steps
need to be taken in order to halt the wave of mergers now sweeping
the country? Why have so few mergers been proceeded against under
the new antimerger law, the Celler-Kefauver law, which was referred
to in the report as the antimonopoly law of 1950?
Does responsibility lie with Congress for failing to appropriate enough
money, with some organic defect in the law, or with the present administration for failure to enforce the law? What should public policy be
toward the problem of price leadership, where one big company calls the
tune and everyone else follows? If the law against price discrimination
is rendered completely ineffective, will not the power to obtain price
concessions replace efficiency in determining economic survival.
These, Ir. Chairman, are just a few of the fundamental questions
which the committee, that is the Attorney General's committee, passes
over or handles in such a way as to give us no helpful clue for the framing
of public policy. The report is written as if its authors were completely
out of touch with reality-with the nature of the world in which we live
and have our being.
The report of the majority of the Attorney General's committee does
not even recognize this most ominous of trends. And, since it ignores
what is obvious to everyone else, it can afford to ignore, as it does, the
important related questions: What have been the causes of this upward
trend in economic concentration? To what extent has it been due to
mergers, to the use of predatory practices, such as price discrimination, to
the use of swollen reserves made possible by fabulous profits, to changes
in the tax laws which have favored big business, to the procurement
policy of the Defense Department, to the failure of the administrative
agencies to enforce the law, and to other causes? And what should be
done to arrest this onward march of monopoly? What new legislation
needs to be passed to halt the growth of giant monopolistic corporations
while there is still time? On all of these questions, which represent
the essence of the monopoly problem, the report is silent. Like the
ostrich, the committee apparently operated on the basis of the assumption
that that which it chose not to see does not exist. (See pp. 5 and 6 of this
report).
Although the Attorney General's Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws
and the report of that committee admitted that it was not its purpose of function to study and report upon the economic and business conditions which
require our antimonopoly policy, the report of the Attorney General's committee nevertheless seeks to lend respectability to and peddle the new economic concept of "workable" or "effective" competition. That concept, as
previously noted, originated with and was sponsored by writers defending
violators of our antitrust laws.
It originated in the arguments of industries hard pressed by public resentment and by legal necessity to rationalize their basing-point systems. In
connection with cement, steel, glucose, and conduit, the monstrous conclusion
was reached that the matching of delivered quotations by a number of sellers
at a given destination was the inevitable result of competitive behavior.
Almost invariably, these economic "analyses" have reasoned in effect:
(1) perfect competition results in a single price in any one market; (2) all
buyers at a given destination pay identical amounts to all sellers who sell on
a delivered basis; (3) therefore, basing-point systems providing for and
resulting in a matching of delivered-price quotations by a number of sellers
are competitive. The causal sequence implicit in this series of nonsequiturs
has been developed by a judicious application of a few competitive principles
alternately to one side of the market or the other, as the rationalization required, but never to both sides at once.
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the new body of economic and legal literature arguing that the practice
For instance, consider the definition of "price" which is crucial to their
conclusion. The report of the Attorney General's committee defined the
relevant price to be the "actual, laid-down cost to the buyer." This would be
all right, as far as it goes, except that it entirely ignores the seller's side of
the market, without which obviously no competition can exist.
In averring that competition is present, on the other hand, the arguments
switch to the other side of the transaction, and claim that delivered pricing
systems are made competitive by the presence of many sellers quoting in a
given market. Here, the buyer's side of the market is conveniently overlooked.
On closer scrutiny, it is plain that the multibuyer characteristic of the competitive arrangement is absent, and the "market" contemplated is the individual buyer's destination.
Much has been made of the homogeneity of products, for instance in the
cement and conduit cases. In the cement case, it was found that this alleged
homogeneity was mainly myth. But even if it were true that the physical
qualities were unvarying as among suppliers, still the element of transportation has been excluded from the characteristics of the product, but included
in the price-the "actual, laid-down cost"-which the buyer pays for that
product. Thus, the "relevant" price which is supposed to derive from this
"effective" competition bears no relationship to the "homogeneity" whose
presence is presumed to contribute to the competitiveness of the situation.
This discrepancy was dismissed by the Attorney General's committee with
the magnificently irrelevant remark that such theoretical refinements leave
the buyer cold, since he is not interested in costs or receipts of the seller, but
only in the cost to himself. If the buyer were free to bargain separately for
the homogeneous product and for its delivery service, it is highly unlikely that
he would long remain cold to this technicality. For example, in the case of
the glucose basing-point systems, it was hardly a matter of indifference to
buyers in Decatur who received delivery from Staley's Decatur plant, that
they paid for glucose-plus-freight from a Chicago basing point.
Moreover, this product homogeneity led to the conclusion, argued explicitly
in the conduit case, that "no buyer will pay more for the product of one
seller than he will for that of another." The germ of truth in this half of
the story is, however, not relevant to the delivered pricing situation. For if
competition exists in a meaningful sense, there is an inevitable corollary: that
no seller will take less for the product from one buyer than from another. The
pretense that '"mill net" is not relevant merely because it is not quoted only
serves to veil the obvious fact that in delivered pricing systems, the seller
does indeed receive varying amounts from buyers at different locations.
Thus, the conclusions of "effective competition" rest on selective use of
competitive characteristics, and the arguments leap with agility from one side
of the market to the other. Because delivered prices are uniform at a given
destination, the "market" is so defined at the buyer's location. This ignores
the fact that competition requires not only "many sellers" but also "many
buyers." Clearly, there are not many buyers at the individual buyer's doorstep, where the "actual laid-down cost to the buyer" constitutes the "relevant"
prce. The arguments ignore the fact that homogeneity of a product means
homogeneity of services supplied by the seller, as well as homogeneity of
services received by the buyer. They ignore the fact that the term "price
applies not only to the amount the buyer pays, but also to the amount the
seller actually receives for the product he sells. While it is true that a buyer
will not pay more to one seller than to another, it is equally true that in a
competitive market a seller will not accept less from one buyer than from
another. Thus when the market is viewed as a two-sided relationship, it is
clear that the tests imposed by "effective.competition' . are. no. test of competitiveness at all.
7. The-report of the Attorney General's committee was released on March
31, 1955, with considerable fanfare and publicity. There were speeches of
praise by the Attorney General of the United States, Assistant Attorney General Stanley N. Barnes, and his cochairman, Prof. S. Chesterfield Oppenheim,
when they addressed an evening meeting of the antitrust section of the American Bar Association in Washington, D.C., on the day the report was released.
Immediately, thousands of copies of the report were printed by the Government
Printing Office and were distributed widely. At the suggestion of Professor
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of price discrimination is a "competitive" practice and that we needed
Oppenheim, Attorney General Brownell took steps to distribute copies of the
report to every judge who would have jurisdiction over, and be responsible
for making decisions, in future antimonopoly cases. Likewise, educational
leaders, who would be expected to teach what our antimonopoly laws are
and should be, were supplied with copies of the report. Also officials of Government agencies who are charged with the responsibility of determining
what action should be brought under our antimonopoly laws were supplied
with copies of the report. (See pp. 60-63 of this report.)
8. The purpose in publishing and distributing the report of the Attorney
General's committee in the manner and to the extent utilized was to affect
the thinking and views of enforcement officials, judges, and others who would
be concerned about our antitrust laws and antitrust policy. (See p. 61 of this
report.)
One of the prominent members of the Attorney General's committee, when
asked as to whether the report of the Attorney General's committee as distributed to the Federal judges would impress them, answered "I hope so"
(p. 61 of this report).
One of the witnesses who testified in the hearings before the House Small
Business Committee with reference to the report of the Attorney General's
National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws stated that report isa headline-saturated document that is going to affect and color the thinking of American courts and American lawyers and law school students and
law school professors for many years to come.
9. The report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study the
Antitrust Laws is being cited in pending cases in the courtroom to influence
the decisions of the courts. One remarkable aspect of such citations is that the
Attorney General's report is being cited as an authority to support in court
the views of those who helped write it. One instance of that has occurred in
an antimonopoly case pending in a United States Circuit Court of Appeals. In
that case, an attorney who was a member of the Attorney General's committee
cited the report of that committee which he helped write as an authority to
support the position which he was taking in the case at bar. In that connection
he failed to disclose to the court that he helped write the document upon
which he was relying. The report of the Attorney General's committee has
been cited and relied upon in other court cases. (See pp. 62-63 of this report.)
Other lawyers who have cases in court involving problems arising under
the Robinson-Patman Act are busy writing law-review articles in which they
are paraphrasing and summarizing attacks upon the Robinson-Patman Act in
the Attorney Generl's report. In addition to citing, as an authority, the report
they helped write, they also cite and rely upon other writings of others who
were members of the Attorney General's committee. Some of that self-lifting
technique is utilized without informing the readers that the authors of the
writings are partisans advocating the same causes in pending court cases.
Perhaps this is not the rule-of-reason approach, but certainly it is an approach
in the direction of an effort of one to try his lawsuit not in the newspapers but
in law reviews.
Recently there appeared in the Yale Law Journal an article written by an
attorney who was a member of the Attorney General's committee. That article
adroitly failed to disclose that the author is affiliated with a law firm presently
opposing the Government in a pending case arising under the RobinsonPatman Act. The article attempts to deprecate the Robinson-Patman Act and
proceeds to argue many issues of fact and law arising under that act and
present in pending litigation. It is copious in its use of footnotes citing "authorities" upon which it relies for support for the position presented. A substantial
number of all of the "authorities" thus cited, a total of 57, were either to statements contained in the report of the Attorney General's committee or to
writings by members of the Attorney General's committee. Actually the author
of the article appearing in the Yale Law Journal cited seven times his own
writings as "authorities." If this matter were not so serious as- to its probableeffect upon future enforcement and interpretation of our antimonopoly laws,
this instance could be dismissed lightly as an amusing-incident of one attempting to lift himself by his own bootstraps and the bootstraps of his colleagues.
10. The committee deplores these efforts to influence the weakening of the
enforcement and interpretation of our antitrust laws and our antimonopoly
policy.
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a policy of a "rule of reason" for enforcing our antitrust laws so as
to permit the practice of "effective" competition it is not surprising
that the Supreme Court of the United States and the other courts have
perhaps unwittingly relied upon that new body of economic and legal
literature including a Report of the Attorney General's Committee in
making decisions in important antitrust cases. 1 3
In the meantime the avalanche of additions to that new body of
economic and legal literature continues. Those additions serve to
cover up and hide the real issues regarding the significance of monopolistic price discrimination. One of the most recent articles on this
subject appeared in the HarvardBusiness Review, November-December 1957, entitled "Is Competitive Pricing Legal?" In a subheading to
that article, it was stated:
The answer to this paradox still hangs in the balance, but the FTC

and the courts now seem to be getting closer to the realities of business.n14
As has been observed, the Supreme Court, in its decision in the
Standard Oil case, relied upon a substantial part of that new body of
economic and legal literature accumulated to the date of that decision,
and adopted the arguments of that group which opposed the application of our antitrust laws to the use of the practice of monopolistic
discriminations." 5 The Court in adopting those arguments and the
topsy-turvy notions about price discrimination stated:
It is enough to say that Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman
Act either to abolish competition or so radically to curtail it that a seller
would have no substantial right of self-defense against a price raid by a
competitor. For example, if a large customer requested his seller to meet
a temptingly lower price offered to him by one of his seller's competitors,
the seller may well find it essential, as a matter of business survival, to
11. The antimonopoly laws are essential to the preservation not only of our
economic but also of our political liberty. A nation in which all economic
power is concentrated in the hands of a relatively few giant business firms
cannot long survive as a political democracy. The history of other nations
makes this clear. Given a choice between private socialism in the form of
business monopoly, or public socialism in the form of government monopoly,
or some other form of totalitarianism, a nation will always eventually select
the latter. If we are to preserve, therefore, our political liberty, we must make
certain that economic concentration of power does not get beyond the danger
point in the United States.
12. A fair and searching study of our antitrust laws and the monopoly situation in the United States is essential. It is made more essential by the appearance and distribution of the "stacked" and "loaded" report of the Attorney
General's committee with the great prestige accorded that committee by the
fact that its membership was personally approved by President Eisenhower
at the instance of Attorney General Brownell.
113. United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
114. Robbins, Is Competitive Pricing Legal? Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec.
1957, p. 83-89. See also Rowe, BorderlandIssue in Court and Commission Cases
Under Subsections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, 8 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION
REPORT 60-82

(1956).

1i5. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1950).
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meet that price rather than to lose the customer. It might be that this
customer is the seller's only available market for the major portion of the
seller's product, and that the loss of this customer would result in forcing
a much higher unit cost and higher sales price upon the *seller's other

customers .... 116

Thus, it appears that one of the factors contributing to the making
of these damaging decisions, including that in the Standard Oil case,
has been this new body of economic and legal literature which' has
made it appear to the Court that the practice of price discrimination is
a "competitive" practice and that laws passed by Congress to curb
monopolistic price discriminations are laws against "competition."
Another factor which appears to have played a part in prompting
the damaging decision in the Standard Oil case was a misconstruction
that the Court placed upon one of its earlier decisions.
In seizing upon the self-defense concept as a basis for approving
Standard's use of the practice of price discrimination, the Court not
only turned to the writings of persons who had been employed by
violators of our antitrust laws, but also misconstrued an earlier decision in the Staley case.117 The partisan law review articles had served
to "educate" the Court on what to do about the Standard Oil case.
Some of those writings were to the effect that Standard was required
to use monopolistic practices as a matter of self-defense. In other
words, it was argued that it was necessary for Standard to engage in
the practice of price discrimination and destroy its smaller competitors
in order to defend itself from the effects of lawful competitive pricing
practices of those smaller competitors.
Finally it appears that the Court, in concluding that it made no
difference whether the smaller competitors were acting in a lawful
manner, misconstrued and used as a basis for that conclusion the
Court's earlier decision in the Staley case." 8
In the earlier Staley case opinion and decision, the Court had rejected a plea by Staley that it was justified in engaging in price
discrimination because it had done so under section 2 (b) in "good
faith" in adopting in toto a competitor's illegal basing point system
of pricing. The Court had decided that Staley was not justified. It
was clear that Staley, in meeting the prices of its competitors, was
doing nothing more than adopting and becoming a party to an illegal
basing point system of pricing. One of the immediate and direct
effects was a fixing of prices by competitors through the use of that
system. It appeared that one of the later effects would be a substantial
lessening of competition among Staley's customers.
116. Id. at 249.
117. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mffg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
118. Ibid.
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In no respect did the facts before the Court suggest that Staley's discriminations were made for the purpose of defending itself against an
unlawful attack or, for that matter, against an attack of any kind.
However, it does appear that the Court was aware that both Staley and
its competitor, whose prices it was meeting, in earlier years had been
charged with using a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act by
reason of their use of the mentioned basing point system of price discrimination and price fixing. Staley and its competitor had entered
into a consent decree in the disposition of that case.
In the light of the record of the Staley case, and what the Court in
the Standard Oil case recited about the failure of Staley's "good faith"
defense, it appears that the Court merely decided that Staley was not
justified in violating the law simply because its competitor had influenced it to join in that violation. In other words, "one violation of
law does not justify another."
Now, when the Court picked up the Standard case and started its
consideration of it under the influence of all the writings of apologists
for monopolists who were opposing the Robinson-Patman Act, it
found in the Staley case that Staley had not been permitted to take
advantage of unlawful conduct of its competitor to establish Staley's
"good faith" defense. The Courts seized upon that idea as an excuse
for holding in effect that if Standard's small competitors had been
also engaged in unlawful conduct perhaps Standard should not be
permitted to make its "good faith" defense.
In the Standard Oil case, the Court pointed out that Standard's
smaller competitors were engaged in lawful conduct. Therefore, it
held that the situation in that case was different from the situation
it found in the Staley case. Indeed, the situation was different because,
in the Standard Oil case, Standard's smaller competitors were in no
conspiracy with Standard to use an unlawful pricing system to the
detriment of the consuming public. They were engaging in lawful
conduct only. They were vigorous competitors of Standard, offering
goods and merchandise at lower, non-discriminatory, lawful prices.
Thus, the bitterest pill of all, and one of the most ironic developments
in all of our antitrust history, befell a valiant effort to arrest the
march of monopolistic price discrimination. The Court put the rubber
stamp of approval on Standard's continuation of that monopolistic
practice.
LEADERS IN CURMENT OPPOSITION TO

H. R. 11 mmD S. 11

Current powerful opposition is being expressed to the enactment

of H. R. 11 and S. 11 into law. Who are the principal leaders in that
opposition? It is no longer a secret that representatives of the
Standard Oil Company of Indiana and representatives of other major
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oil companies met at 9:30 a.m., in the Crystal Ballroom at the Blackstone Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, October 12, 1956, and secretly formulated
plans for an undercover lobbying campaign against H. R. 11 and S.
11.119 That meeting was called by an official of the American Petroleum
Institute and the Shell Oil Company. The call for the meeting was
in the form of a letter dated October 1, 1956, directed to a highly
selected group of representatives of major oil companies. It was
20
marked "Private and Confidential.'
During the course of that meeting plans were discussed for basing
the lobbying campaign against H. R. 11 and S. 11, principally upon
a brief which had been prepared by the American Petroleum Institute.12 ' That brief, in reference to H. R. 11 and S. 11 attached a most
sinister meaning to the proposed legislation. 122
The API brief proceeded to argue how small businessmen, including jobbers and retailers, would be adversely affected by the bill.
Included in those arguments were the following statements: "Legislation Means the End of Opportunity,' 23 the "Bill Crushes Hope of the
Enterprising Dealer,"' 24 "Price Cutters Would Be Protected by Bill,"'1
"Jobbers Will Suffer Most,"' 26 "Supplier Cannot Take Chance With
Jobber,' 2 7 and "How H. R. 11 Hurts the Retail Gasoline Dealer."' 28
In addition, arguments were made that if H. R. 11 and S. 11 were
enacted the rule of evidence regarding the burden of proof would
be reversed to the extent that a person charged with the violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act would have the burden of proving that
discriminations in price did not have the effect of substantially lessening competition. Many additional arguments were put forward too
ridiculous for recitation here.
It should be sufficient for the purposes of this article to discuss
one of the arguments made in the API "master brief" in order to
demonstrate the reckless abandon with which the lobbying arguments were advanced. For example, on page 4 of the API "master
brief" there appeared the following statement:
Furthermore, it is important to note that the Robinson-Patman Act
marked a departure from the traditional ideal of American justice by
putting the burden of proof upon the person charged with violating the

law .

.

. unless he could prove that his price decision had no effect on

119. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate
Committee on the Judiciaryj85th Cong,-lst.Sess. 59-60, 72-82 (1957).
120. Id. at 59-60.
121. Id. at 85-107.
122. Id. at 157.
123. Id. at 97.
124. Id. at 96.
125. Id. at 94.
126. Id. at 87.
127. Id. at 89.
128. Id. at 165.
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competition, he would probably be in violation of the law if this legislation should pass.
Now what are the facts?
The general common-low rule regarding the burden of proof in
a case in litigation applies in price discrimination cases arising under
the Robinson-Patman Act. In general that rule is to the following
effect: The burden of proof in any proceeding lies at first on that party
against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence at all were produced on either side-regard, of course, being
had to any presumption which may appear upon the pleadings.
Let us analyze how that rule applies in a price discrimination
case arising under the Robinson-Patman Act. First of all, pleadings
by the plaintiff or the Government in order to state a cause of action
in a price discrimination case under the Robinson-Patman Act must,
among other things, allege that:
(1) The party charged with a violation of the law is engaged in
commerce (meaning, of course, interstate commerce).
(2) In the course of such commerce the party charged has discriminated in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality and that some of those purchases involved
in such discrimination were in interstate commerce.
(3) The sale of the commodities involved in the discrimination
were sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States
or some other place under the jurisdiction of the United States.
(4) The effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with the customers of either of them.
Pleadings by the plaintiff or the Government in such litigation not
containing allegations to the effect indicated above would fail as not
having stated a cause of action.
What about the burden of proof in such proceedings? First, let us
assume that a simple answer had been ified by the defendant who
merely denied the allegations made by the plaintiff. Assume further
that no evidence was offered by either party. Then under the general
rule regarding the burden of proof the plaintiff would fail. He had
alleged a good cause of action but he had failed to prove his case.
The burden of proving the case is upon the plaintiff and that means
proving each of the necessary allegations as above indicated. The
defendant need not prove any of those allegations. In his pleadings
it is sufficient for him merely to deny them.
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Momentarily, when :they have lapsed into unguarded pose and
permitted their better selves to express their inner thoughts, arch
opponents of S. 11 and H.R. 11 have acknowledged that what is contended in the API "master brief" is not true. They admit that the
person charged does not have the burden of proving "that his price
decision had no effect on the competition."
At page 7 of the API "master brief," the statement was made:
If all manufacturers in an industry complied with this law, they would
be in danger of being charged with a conspiracy to fix prices.
That, like the API argument about the burden of proof, is utter
nonsense. Nothing in the Robinson-Patman Act requires any two
or more sellers of any commodity to charge the same or different
prices. Nothing in that law requires any seller to act in any particular
way regarding his relationship with another seller. The Act applies
only against a single seller's action in discriminating in price among
his own customers. It is significant that the API "master brief" failed
to cite any decision in a case supporting its nonsensical arguments.
The method used by these leaders, opposing H.R. 11 and S. 11,
included a wide distribution of the arguments contained in the API
"master brief" to the hundreds of thousands of petroleum distributors
in the United States, most of whom are small businessmen. 129 Not
only were these arguments widely distributed to the hundreds of
thousands of small businessmen but also many of the latter, who
were operating under contracts to secure their gasoline from the
major oil companies, found themselves under pressure from their
suppliers to use the API "master brief" arguments in communications
to Congressmen and Senators, asking them to vote against H.R.11
and S. 11.130
Of course, that pressure by suppliers on small businessmen resulted
in many Congressmen and Senators receiving telegrams and other
communications from small businessmen requesting that H.R. 11
3
and S. 11 be defeated.' '
Some of the small businessmen, who were thus pressured into communicating with members of Congress indicating opposition to H.R.
11 and S. 11, gained enough courage to shake off the influence of
that pressure and to renounce the opposition to H.R. 11 they had ex129. Id. at 74-79, 85-110, 157-66, 171-80, 186-88, 228-29, 234-36.

130. Id. at 178-80.
131. See, e.g., speeches and debates on this subject which were made in
Congress, '"Major Oil Companies Organize False Front Lobby To Oppose
930 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1957);
Rzc. Operators
103 CoNG.
Bill," Service
of Opportunity
Equality
"Big
Ol Companies
Pressuring
Station
to Wire Congressmen
Against H.R. 11," 103 CoNG. REc. 1102 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1957); "Standard Oil
Company of California Admits Influencing Its Dealers to Oppose H.R. 11,"
103 CONG. REc. 1401 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1957).
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pressed. An example of evidence to that effect was placed before the
House of Representatives on January 28, 1957. At that time a copy
of a telegram by one small businessman was called to the attention
of the House. It is as follows:
HON. ALAN BIBLE,
United States Senator,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:
About 7:30 p.m. last Friday, January 18, I sent you a wire which I
desire to explain the true circumstances about.
I did not send this wire voluntarily but was pressured into sending it
by representative of my supplying company, Standard Oil Company of
California, who told me that H.R. 11, the equality of opportunity bill,
would be injurious to service-station operators.
I have since learned that this is wholly untrue and that our national
organization and State association are both unanimously supporting this
legislation.
I ask you to support this legislation in the interest of service station
operators and to be on the watch for this propaganda lobbying campaign
by which major oil companies are victimizing and pressuring servicestation operators to send wires against the operator's own interests.
RAY EYLER,
R1aigy
er's West End Service Stdtion.
RENO, NEV.132

SMALL INDEPENDENT COMPETING BusINEss CONCERNS NEED
AM PLEAD FOR H.R. 11 AND S. 11.

We know that small business and many of the friends of small
business are asking for relief from destructive price discriminations.
They have appeared before a number of congressional committees
and testified in support of legislation such as is proposed by H.R. 11
and S. 11. In some of their appearances, they have stated that among
the many things that small businesses wish from the Congress, and
particularly in the field of antimonopoly legislation, is legislation to
strengthen the law against price discrimination. They have said
that there are many things that small business needs and wants, and
that there are several pieces of legislation which they strongly recommend, including tax relief. But they said that (just to make things
simple) they want the Congress to pass promptly the legislation provided for in H.R. 11 and S. 11. Included among those who have taken
that position are the representatives of a large segment of the small
business firms of the country. They include the following:
National Association of Retail Druggists, representing 40,000 independent
druggists.
National Association of Retail Grocers, representing 65,000 grocers.
132. 103 CONG. REC. 931 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1957).
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U.S. Wholesale Grocers Association, representing about 2,000 wholesale
grocery firms.
National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, representing approximately
35,000 retail gasoline dealers.
National Association of Independent Tire Dealers, representing 3,000
retail tire dealers and tire retreaders.
United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association, representing 2,800 wholesale distributors of fresh fruits and vegetables.
National Federation of Independent Business with a membership of more
than 100,000 small and independent business firms. 133
Equally significant is the showing that small businessmen and
their representatives have made in their appearances before Congressional Committees regarding the need for legislation to strengthen the
law against destructive price discriminations. Striking testimony was
presented showing how the small independent manufacturing bakers
are being destroyed by price discrimination practiced by the large
nation-wide chain bakers. 134 Representatives of small businessmen
engaged in the distribution of food products testified concerning the
matter in which price discrimination practices are destroying competition in that industry. i3
Representatives of small businessmen engaged in the distribution of-.petroleun-products testified -how'-price
discrimination is leading to monopoly control in that segment of
136
industry.
Under date of March 8, 1957, the Armstrong Creamery Company
of Wichita, Kansas, wrote a letter to members of the House and
to members of the Senate in which price discrimination practices
of the National Dairy Products Corporation were outlined. That
up-to-date instance of price discrimination was described by the
Armstrong Creamery Company as follows:
Recently the National Dairies Division (Sealtest) at Kansas City lowered
the price of ice cream 250 per gallon throughout this area. Discounts and
all other factors considered, this new price is lower than 97% of the sales
volume in the area before Sealtest lowered the price. This low price makes
it impossible for any dairy to sell ice cream at a profit, and if continued
very long will force a number of independent plants out of business. At
the same time Sealtest has been raising prices in other areas where competitive situations are as bad, or worse, than they are here.
The plain fact is that through ineptness and mismanagement, Sealtest
133. Hearings on Price Discrimination Before the House Select Committee
on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 346 (1955); Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee, House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
132 (1956) (on H.R. 11 and other proposals to amend § 2 of the Clayton Act);
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 959 (1956) (on S. 11 and other
-proposalsto -amend § 2 of -the'Clayton Act).
134. Hearings on Price Discrimination, House Select Committee on Small
Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 335-400 (1955).
135. Id. at 400-25.
136. Id. at 425-49,-914:32.
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has'ltst a lot of volume in the past few years and has taken this method
of regaining their position. Right now they can use the excuse that they
are meeting the price of the 3% of the volume which was sold at a
cut-throat figure (and which will always be sold that way).
. Of course Sealtest's profits in other areas will more than carry the
losses they will take in this one.
We would appreciate the favor if you would take the time to tell us
what your objections are. We hope they can be overcome and that you
will do everything you can to pass the bill.
It is the only salvation for a great number of independent businesses.13 7
CONCLUSION

The problem is now up to Congress. It is stated in the question,
"What can be done to help correct the error that was made by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Standard Oil case?" H.R.
11 and S. 11 provide the answer to that question.
H.R. 11 is to amend subsection 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The intent of the bill is to accept the Standard Oil of Indiana,opinion
up to the point where the effects of a discriminatory price reach a
certain degree of seriousness, but to put a limit on the good-faith
defense, so that it will not be a bar to a cease-and-desist order where
the effects of the discrimination go beyond this degree of seriousness.
This degree of seriousness is at the point where, in the language of the

bill:
The effect of the discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
The bill does nothing more than that. The protection which this
language would give falls far short of the protection which the

language of the prohibition in subsection 2(a) would offer. The
language there refers to discriminations:
Where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to

injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers
of either of them.
As was observed in the first part of this article, H.R. 11 will leave
competitors free to expend effort to take customers away from each
other by lawful and competitive methods.
H.R. 11 will deny that privilege to giant business concerns which
attempt to take the customers away from their small competitors
137. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1459 (1957) (on S. 11 and
other proposals to amend § 2 of the Clayton Act).
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through the use of unZawful price discrimination practices where the
effect would be to substantially lessen competition. In other words,
H.R. 11 simply says that we do not want monopoly in this country,
whether or not it results from acts and practices carried on in "good
faith." Preservation of competition is the paramount aim of H.R. 11.
It strikes at practices which have the effect of lessening competition,
irrespective of intent.

